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Murniz Allen Vasay Coson 
Claremont Graduate University 
2012 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation will explore how developing provinces within countries 
attract foreign direct investment.  The policy implication to this study is important 
because it could account for the uneven distribution of growth in developing countries 
that so frequently leads to dual economies.  To attract foreign direct investments, 
provincial governments compete among themselves trying to appeal to international 
investors. 
 There is consensus in the economic development literature that both economic 
and political variables interact to advance a nation‟s economy.  The ability for a 
country to provide a free market economy to exchange goods and ideas makes the 
environment more favorable for investors, hence it makes sense to focus on 
institutions that can attract FDI if the government is committed to developing its 
economy and compete in the global market.  Political factors serves as an important 
component of strengthening a country‟s economy.  Political variables such as political 
capacity have helped ensure the success of a growing economy. Governments must 
possess the ability to extract resources from its people, thereby pursuing policy goals 
to create a more favorable market environment for investors.  Investors then feel more 
confident and comfortable investing in these economies.  This political variable has 
  
 
helped countries redefine themselves in the global community as credible and safe 
countries for investment.  However, this political variable alone is not enough to 
explain how to attract foreign direct investments in developing countries.  Rather, 
governments must also possess the economic tools necessary, such as economic 
growth and an open economy.  These economic tools combined with political 
capacity can effectively attract foreign direct investments.  Many provinces in 
developing countries lack these variables, thereby jeopardizing the opportunity to 
attract foreign direct investments and compete in the global market.  Hence, I look at 
both the political and economical variables as an interaction variable as a strong 
indicator to attract foreign direct investments.  
If my work is successful, I hope that these findings can serve as a policy tool 
for provinces of developing countries to effectively attract foreign direct investments 
in a competitive global market. 
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The Interaction of Political Capacity and Economic Growth to 
Attract Foreign Direct Investments at the Provincial Levels in 
Developing Countries 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUERY 
 
In the twenty-first century, capitalism continues to flourish especially in 
developing countries found in Asia, Latin America, and Africa (World Bank 2005).  
Private investment is a key to capitalism.  Investments comes in many forms, but 
domestic investment (DI) is primarily used to measure a country‟s ability to grow 
economically.  However, a growing trend in the literature has focused on another type of 
investment called foreign direct investments (FDI).  Such investments provide 
compelling data for development in countries where DI is limited and/or scarce.  FDI is 
used to stimulate a country‟s economy with the intentions of becoming self-sufficient and 
to compete in the global market.  Studies have shown that FDI and economic 
development are both positive and highly correlated (Borensztien 1998).  Moreover, FDI 
has improved many countries‟ infrastructures and industries due to its cost effectiveness, 
by concurrently emulating or importing these technologies from developed countries 
(OECD 2002).   
 This dissertation will explore how provincial governments within developing 
countries can attract foreign direct investments.  The policy implication to this study is 
important because it could account for the uneven distribution of growth at the provincial 
level in developing countries.  To attract foreign direct investments, provincial 
governments must compete among themselves by appealing to international investors that 
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it is committed in improving the growth of the nation through sets of political and 
economical policies.  
 There is consensus in the development literature that both economic and political 
variables interact to advance economic development (De Soto 2000).  Economic 
variables, such as output from main industries: primary (mining), secondary 
(manufacturing), and tertiary (services) greatly contribute to a developing country‟s 
economy (World Bank 2004).  The ability for a country to provide a free market 
economy to exchange goods and ideas makes the environment more favorable for 
investors (World Bank 2005).  In addition to these variables, it makes sense to focus on 
the institutions that extract resources from its people, thereby implementing sound 
policies to attract FDI and compete in the global market.  Political factors serves as an 
important component for strengthening a country‟s economy.  Political variables such as 
political capacity have helped ensure the success of many developing countries through 
the ability of making a more favorable market environment for international investors, 
thus alleviating the sense of anxiety and fear from lost investments (World Bank 2004).   
These political variables have helped countries redefine themselves in the global 
community as credible and safe countries for investments.  However, these economic and 
political factors alone are not enough to explain how provincial governments in 
developing countries effectively attract foreign direct investments.  Provincial 
governments must possess both the economic growth and the political capacity to 
effectively attract foreign direct investments.  Many provinces within developing 
countries lack either the economic or political variable needed to convince international 
investors that it is safe to invest in its province, thereby hurting the opportunity to 
effectively attract foreign direct investments.  Hence, we look at the interaction of 
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political capacity and economic growth as a strong indicator to attract foreign direct 
investments.  
 
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 This paper will try to explain that political capacity alone in provincial 
governments is enough to effectively attract foreign direct investments, rather a 
combination of economic growth and political capacity are needed to make the 
environment favorable for international investors.  Based on modifications of the work by 
Coan and Kugler (2009), we will investigate how provincial governments of three 
developing countries - China, India, and Indonesia – depend on this interaction variable 
to attract FDI.  The model incorporates provincial data from 1994-2000 from the World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations (UN).   
 If our work is successful, we hope that these findings can serve as a policy tool for 
provinces of developing countries to effectively attract foreign direct investments and 
compete in the global market.             
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 To attract FDI, provincial governments in developing countries need to establish 
institutions and provide opportunities in industries through the adoption of economic 
policies committed in improving the nation‟s economy.  We propose that the combination 
of both economic growth and political capacity will allow provincial governments to 
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effectively attract foreign direct investments.  Such arguments are summarized in the 
following hypothesis:   
H1: The interaction of Political Capacity and Economic Growth leads to provincial 
governments in developing countries to effectively attract FDI 
 
We can represent this argument in the following form: 
 
FDI = b0 + b1(RPC)it + b2(GDP) it + b3(RPC*GDP) it + b4(Democracy) it + b5(Open 
Economy) it + eit 
 
 Where FDI represents the stock flow amount of foreign direct investments in a 
provincial government in a given year; RPC represents the measure of a province‟s 
relative political capacity; GDP represents the value of all final commodities and services 
produced in a province in a given year; RPC*GDP represents the interaction between the 
provincial government‟s relative political capacity and gross domestic product; 
Democracy represents India and Indonesia and is added as a dummy variable, while 
China represents „Non-Democracy;‟ Open Economy represents the provinces‟ openness 
through an issue continuum from a scale of 0 (close economy) to 100 (open economy); 
and e represents the stochastic error term.   
 In order to understand the effects of FDI, there needs to be a fundamental 
explanation for the importance of economic growth, such as GDP in a developing nation.  
There is consistent trend in the field arguing for economic and political variables to exist 
for economic growth to commence (De Soto 2000).  Economic variables such as 
economic growth rates, gross domestic product per capita (GDP per capita), and 
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industrialization greatly contribute to a developing country‟s economy.  Moreover, the 
ability for a country to provide economic freedom through enforcement of property rights 
and the ease of capital mobility increases the investors‟ comfort levels to invest in the 
country (World Bank 2004).  It makes sense for countries to focus on its industries to 
attract FDI if they are committed in boosting its economy bettering the lives of its nation 
and its citizens.   
 In addition, political factors have also served as an important component of 
strengthening a country‟s economy.  Political variables such as civil liberties and civil 
rights have helped ensure the success of a growing economy as investors are exposed to 
individual freedoms granted and protected by the government alleviating any concerns 
for political tyranny and political power abuse, which leads to corruptive measures 
(World Bank 2004).  These political variables have helped countries redefine themselves 
in the global community as credible and safe countries for many things, especially to 
boost an ailing economy into a global competitor through attracting FDI.  Plus, these 
political variables also reminds international investors similar political freedoms they 
enjoy back home reassuring them that it is a safe country for investments.  However, 
these variables do not provide a complete explanation of what attracts FDI into a 
provincial government in a developing country.  It is important to analyze the correlation 
between economic and political variables with a country‟s economic levels, but it is more 
vital to understand why international investors are willing to invest in a provincial 
government.  Political institutions in developing countries that yield high or low rule of 
law levels can determine the ineffectiveness or effectiveness for attracting FDI.  Hence, 
we look at the political capacity of a government at the provincial level as a political 
factor in attracting FDI in the three developing countries.   
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POLITICAL FACTORS 
1. Relative Political Capacity (RPC) 
This variable has been used in many ways, from determining the correlation of 
economic growth at sub-national levels, to suggesting positive relations with 
population, fertility, and mortality rates.  It is argued that it tests much better than 
traditional variables, such as military expenditures.  Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
high levels of political capacity will be positively correlated with FDI.     
 
2. Democracy  
This dummy variable is included to gauge whether or not democracies and 
autocracies have an effect in attracting foreign direct investments. It is argued that 
democracies are a much freer society with traits such as civil liberties and civil rights 
given to the people to exercise without fear of arrest and/or persecution. Therefore, it 
is hypothesized that democracies will positively correlate with FDI.  
  
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
1. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
This is the main variable we are studying, and more importantly trying to find out 
how provincial governments attract FDI appealing to international investors that it is 
safe to conduct business.  It is argued that high levels of FDI will lead to a stronger 
economy enabling the country to compete in the global market.  
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2. Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  
This variable has been argued to be a good proxy to measure the well-being of a 
nation.  In addition, the data is readily available as it is computed by calculating the 
market value of all final commodities and services produced in a country, or in this 
case, a province.  It is argued that higher levels of GDP improve the overall economy.  
Therefore, it is hypothesized that GDP will be positively correlated with FDI.   
 
3. Open Economy 
This variable is different in several ways as there is a scale that measures how close 
or open a province is depending on the three types of industry sectors in a country: 
Primary, which mainly consists of the mining industry, Secondary, which includes 
manufacturing, and Tertiary, which includes the financial and telecommunication 
sectors.  Open Economy is used to measure the economic abilities of a country for 
potential economic development and foreign capital accumulation.  Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that a country‟s economic openness will be positively correlated with 
FDI. 
 
 
DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
 According to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD), FDI reflects the objective of obtaining a strong interest made by a direct 
investor to an economy other than his/her.  This interest implies the existence of a long-
term relationship between both parties and their influence in the economy.  Direct 
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investment involves both the initial transaction between the two entities and all 
subsequent capital transactions between them and among affiliated enterprises, both 
incorporated and unincorporated.   
 The Bureau of Economic Analysis defines FDI as ownership or control, directly 
or indirectly, by one foreign person, or entity, of ten percent or more of the voting 
securities of an incorporated U.S. business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an 
unincorporated business enterprise.   
 
Relative Political Capacity 
 There is very little research in this particular field of foreign direct investment at 
the provincial level in developing countries, which can be an advantage in the literature 
as the contributions for policy implications can be used to develop economies.  It can also 
provide an intriguing insight for future researchers to invest their time and energy in this 
field, thereby improving the literature. 
 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
According to the CIA World Factbook, GDP is defined as the value of all final 
goods and services produced within a nation in a given year.  
 
Democracy 
 According to CIA World Factbook, Democracy is defined as a form of 
government in which the supreme power is retained by the people, but which is usually 
exercised indirectly through a system of representation and delegated authority 
periodically renewed. 
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 Open Economy 
 According to the World Bank, Open Economy is defined as the phase of a 
country‟s economic development where an industry grows faster than the agricultural 
industry, hence becoming the country‟s leading economic industry.   
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 To test the empirical model of the interaction between economic growth and 
political capacity, we utilized a regression analysis using a panel data on three developing 
countries: China, India, and Indonesia and its provinces (totaling eighty-nine provinces) 
from 1994 – 2000.  Although missing data is present due to the challenges of finding and 
collecting data at the provincial levels, we have a sufficient amount of observations in the 
model for this panel data.   
 
Dependent Variable: FDI  
 This is the main variable that we are testing to determine its impact with respect to 
RPC and other economic and political variables.  Previous researches have used FDI in a 
number of cases, such as Borensztien, De Gregorio, and Lee‟s work in 1998 where they 
argued that FDI can lead to strong economies for both the developed and developing 
countries.  In addition, the economic growth literature provides very compelling for 
strong economies when the FDI stock is used (Feng 2003).  The data will utilize the FDI 
stock of each provincial government as it can better analyze the accumulation of foreign 
capital overtime.  The data comes from various sources, such as the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, India Stats, and BPS-Statistics of Indonesia.  
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Independent Variables: RPC 
 RPC is defined as the ability of a government to effectively extract resources from 
the population given their level of economic development (Arbetman and Johnson 2007).  
This variable is measured using a series of multiple regression models with certain 
indicators, such as taxes, natural resources, and exports to predict expected levels of 
extraction.  RPC was developed to test the correlation among a wide variety of variables 
from economic growth to fertility rates (Arbetman and Kugler 1997, Feng 2003).  This 
variable is unique in the sense that it is a measure of a government‟s ability to extract 
resources from its people to pursue policy goals.  The important factor of this variable is 
the level of RPC, which a higher number indicates a more effective government‟s ability 
to extract resources.   
 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
GDP provides compelling data for a country‟s ability to transact goods and 
services in a given year, and more importantly, a measurement of how well the nation is 
doing.  This measure has shown consistency in correlation and significance, and has 
provided several indications of an emerging economy to potentially become an economic 
powerhouse.  The data comes from several databases, namely the World Bank and IMF. 
 
RPC*GDP 
 This is the key independent variable and is the driving force to this dissertation. 
This is the interaction between RPC and GDP, and is calculated by multiplying both 
variables.  
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Open Economy 
 Open Economy is defined in various ways, from the liberalization of markets 
through non-tariff barriers in international trade, to the gradual involvement of various 
industries shaping the country‟s macro-economy (Vos et. al. 2002).  The literature 
suggests that industrialization is positively correlated with economic development (Feng, 
Kugler, Swaminathan, and Zak 2008).  There are several methods to measure Open 
Economy.  The Heritage Foundation provides ten measures of industrialization ranging 
from Business Freedom to Freedom from Corruption, and each variable is measured 
based on certain indicators, such as quantitative data and surveys taken by experts, 
respectively.  An alternate indicator of open economy is the expenditures made in certain 
sectors of the economy, namely mining, agricultural, manufacturing, financial/banking, 
telecommunications, and computer information, which all are grouped in the primary, 
secondary, and tertiary industries.   
 As a country becomes developed, it shifts its economy from the primary industry 
to the secondary industry and finally to the tertiary industry (Kane, Holmes, and O‟Grady 
2007).  This is a good measure of an open economy as it is a sign that governments are 
spending money on certain items, such as establishing banks, improving 
telecommunications, and expanding infrastructure, thereby building trusts and relations 
with its people, and more importantly providing the confidence and safe haven for 
international investors to invest their capital.  These industries are a great indicator of 
how advance a country‟s infrastructure is for development.     
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Control Variables 
 To better test the empirical model without omitted variable bias, we have included 
a dummy variable. This variable has suggested strong correlations with respect to FDI in 
the literature, and could only improve the field by adding our dataset.  Democracy has 
positively affected developing countries‟ economies to become self-sufficient, thereby 
becoming developed nations (Chakrabati 2001).  In theory, Democracy is the best form of 
government as it allows the people to retain supreme power through an indirect system of 
representation. Democracy is a dummy variable and measured as „1‟ for Democracy and 
„0‟ for Non-Democracy.  
 
 
ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH 
The dissertation is broken up into five chapters.  Chapter II will discuss an in-
depth literature review of the variables being used in this study to assist the reader a 
better grasp of the theories behind each variable.  Here, we will discuss the effects of FDI 
at the provincial level in developing countries and determine whether if RPC alone is 
sufficient/insufficient, or if an interaction model needs to be present.  Further, we hope to 
find that our findings can be used as a policy tool at the provincial levels of China, India, 
and Indonesia.    
The methodology section will be discussed in Chapter III defining each variable 
and tracing the sources of data gathering.  We will also explain the purpose of using a 
panel data and using the ordinary least squared (OLS) method as the quantitative tool of 
choice.  Further, we will provide the results from the data in hopes to find correlation 
among the variables.  This section will also discuss some of the issues that accompanies 
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data gathering, specifically the lack of formal institutions that effectively records and 
maintains data at the provincial levels. 
Chapter IV will discuss the empirical results of this dissertation shedding light to 
the importance of a developing country, and more importantly provincial governments 
and what sets of policies needed to effectively attract FDI into its economy.  Lastly, 
Chapter V will discuss the implication and further discussion section hoping that 
developing countries will adopt the policy recommendations to improve its economy and 
compete in the global market.  In addition, this section will highlight what can be done to 
improve the dataset for future researches, and perhaps how the data gathered and the 
quantitative method employed will positively contribute to the literature, thereby 
encouraging the next generation of scholars to expand the research of developing 
countries and find better ways to improve its economies. 
 
 
RELEVANCE OF STUDY 
The importance of provinces in developing countries to attract FDI for economic 
growth is dependent on several factors.  However, the government will always have the 
last say in whether to implement or ignore economic and political policies, hence it is 
vital to point out which developing countries have the potential for policy changes as we 
cannot radically shift a government‟s structure overnight.  Once we rule out a handful of 
developing countries, we can then prescribe our policies in hopes to attract foreign direct 
investments.  Since FDI is a commonly used as an economic indicator to show the 
strength of a nation‟s economy, it is imperative that governments provide the necessary 
institutions that will foster policies to promote economic freedom and political stability.  
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Developing nations that are willing to provide those safeguards should be courted by 
international investors.  We hope that our findings from this study will suggest the 
importance of RPC and Economic Growth as an interaction variable as the main driving 
force in attracting FDI at the provincial levels in developing countries.   
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 The literature accounts for allocations of FDI from both an economic and political 
perspective as well as a combination of political-economic factors. Certain variables, 
such as economic freedom through the establishment of property rights and court systems 
have suggested strong correlations with FDI (Hanson 2005).  In addition, other variables 
that could prevent or slow down investment opportunities, such as high levels of taxes, 
price controls, and corrupt governments can turn away investors and more importantly, 
FDI (De Soto 1989).  It is vital to note the importance of this emerging field due to its 
dynamic of combining economical and political variables, thus making stronger 
arguments for correlation and analyses.  And since this field is relatively new, there are 
an abundance of variables that have yet to be used in research and data collection.   
However, in the economic literature, there are several established variables that have 
been used in multiple researches suggesting consistent findings with FDI in both 
developed and developing countries.   
Countries that experiences high levels of economic growth and increasing levels 
of GDP per capita suggests that its economy has ripened, which spillover into the global 
community leading international investors to invest their capital in the booming economy.   
The most common economic variable used to determine the correlation with 
respect to FDI is economic growth rate.  The ability of a country to experience consistent 
levels of economic growth leads international investors to want „to join in the 
bandwagon‟ to extract the profits before it is too late.  Hence, the growth rate of GDP 
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exerts a small positive impact on inward FDI, which suggests that increases in the level 
of financial development, infrastructure development, and trade openness promote FDI 
(Ang 2008).    
 According to Borensztein et. al, FDI contributes more to economic growth 
relative to domestic investments in industrial countries and most developing countries.  
Figure 1 provides the chart for China between the years 1980 – 2000. However, take note 
after 1995 as FDI soared relative to domestic investments, hence explaining the increase 
in economic growth.  
Figure 1: China’s FDI, DI, and GDP 
 
They looked at sixty-nine developing countries over twenty years, and utilized a 
cross-country regression framework suggesting that FDI flows is relatively more 
important than domestic investments in contributing growth.  This is vital for any nation 
that wants to boost and improve its economic growth to be able to compete in the global 
market.  It seems as if the traditional economic theory of building a strong foundation in 
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only domestic investments is not enough to ensure a strong economy in this very small 
world.  Thus, it is important for nations to understand one key element to the economic 
growth recipe, and that is to include foreign investments, primarily FDI as the main 
ingredient.  Only then can nations experience higher levels of economic growth and 
eventually be able to finally improve the lives of its people.  Another example of how 
FDI positively affects a nation‟s economic growth is the increase levels of its GDP.   
 The GDP is often an important measure of a nation‟s economic success or failure.  
Industrial nations, such as the United States have high levels of GDP, hence transforms a 
nation‟s title from developing to developed nation.  This variable has traditionally been 
the cornerstone of economic theory to determine which nations are improving and 
lagging behind relative to each other.  Since most economic theories, such as the Neo-
classical growth theory and the Endogenous growth theory, although different inputs in 
the process of production, still assumes that GDP is the measurement of a nation‟s 
economic success.  Studies have shown a strong positive correlation of FDI on a nation‟s 
GDP in both industrial and developing nations, along with the impact in regional areas. 
(Balasubramanyam et. al 1996).  Figure 2 shows the correlation among the regional 
variables: GDP, trade, and FDI in China. There is a lot to be said about the effectiveness 
of FDI on GDP even at the provincial level.  
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Figure 2: Regional Data in China 
 
 
Other studies, such as the one conducted by Chowdhury and Mavrotas, suggested 
that it is GDP that causes FDI, hence an important variable to include.  Both authors 
employed an extensive econometric methodology in three developing countries: Chile, 
Malaysia, and Thailand from 1969-2000. Figure 3 provides the time-series graph for FDI 
as a percentage of GDP. These three countries are heavy recipients of FDI and account 
for more than seventy percent.  They implemented the Toda-Yamamoto causality test and 
found strong evidence, especially for Chile‟s GDP affecting FDI.  Moreover, they also 
found strong evidence for a bi-directional causality between GDP and FDI for the 
Southeast Asian countries.  There is growing evidence that both GDP and FDI are 
positively correlated.          
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Figure 3: FDI as a percentage of GDP 
 
 
 The privatization of public enterprises, particularly the service, manufacturing, 
and mining industries attracts FDI, as there are more opportunities for international 
investors to freely invest their capital in the free market system hoping to generate profit.  
We can call this an open economy.  Nations with high levels of economic development 
are relatively considered safe countries to invest in providing a credible commitment to 
exchange goods and services between the host government and investors.  Further, as a 
country privatizes its public sectors, it creates a more efficient and effective private 
infrastructure that can lead to governmental policies of poverty alleviation and job 
creation for its society enhancing the overall welfare of the country (Pamacheche and 
Koma 2007).   
The ability for private institutions to privatize and invest in many developing 
countries with a supportive government has attracted high levels of FDI, such as in the 
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case of Mozambique in the mid-1990s, which led to the production of domestic goods by 
private institutions and then exported to other countries on a tariff-free basis, thus 
allowing this once war-prone country to attract international investors (Lezard 2002).  
Moreover, the ability for a nation to allow private institutions to privatize its service, 
manufacturing, and mining industries can ensure efficient production through advanced 
technology, and research and development, but more importantly, minimize the levels of 
corruption that public institutions are tempted to pursue.  According to Hellman et. al, a 
survey of twenty-two nations analyzed by the Business Environment and Performance 
Survey found no evidence of multinational institutions engaging in corrupt business 
practices than domestic institutions.      
 The service sector, usually seen as the most desirable industry by both domestic 
and international institutions is a good indicator of a nation‟s FDI level.  Studies have 
shown that FDI invested in a nation‟s service industry increases its economy (Markusen 
2000).  Industrial nations have experienced rising levels of FDI, primarily in the 
manufacturing sector then in the service sector post-World War II leading to economic 
growth and stability.  Industrial nations, once reaching economic prosperity, eventually 
saw an opportunity to cultivate the abundance of resources in developing nations, thus 
started the revolution of FDI into developing nations.  Moreover, multinational 
corporations (MNCs) have increased their presence in developing nations for more than 
two decades, and will continue to be a vital player in a developing nation‟s economic 
endeavors (Lecraw 1977).  The service sector has also accounted for a substantial portion 
of a nation‟s gross domestic product and employment rates making it a very lucrative 
industry for foreign investors.  Today, more public and private institutions are 
outsourcing consumer services abroad, such as China and India to meet the needs of 
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institutions‟ consumers as well as to efficiently cut overhead costs and wages (Enderwick 
1989).   
 Another advantage of the service sector is the minimal storage of inventory that 
institutions that invest in either the manufacturing or mining industries must deal with.  
This advantage not only reduces inventory costs, but also enables a higher level of 
mobility transferring and/or opening service center locations.  Further, with the 
advancement of technology, the Internet has truly shaped and revolutionized the 
communication medium of the world, and since the service sector does not necessarily 
involve commodities, the exchange of services can easily be attained via the Internet or 
other technological advancements.  However, public and private institutions do not 
hastily invest its capital without formal research and thorough analysis of risk 
management in any developing nations.  Institutions must be able to trust a developing 
nation‟s government from fear of political corruption and tyranny.  Therefore, institutions 
invest its capital in a government that closely monitors its industry with regulation and 
enforcement, but with the freedom of free market capitalism.  Thus, high levels of FDI 
can be found in credible developing nations, particularly in the service industries of 
telecommunications, banking, and transportation (Dunning 1989).   
 FDI theories also support the argument of institutions investing its capital in 
reputable developing nations (Wells 1981).  It makes sense that once an industrialized 
nation becomes too costly to invest in, the willingness to relocate another business 
venture presents itself, thus enabling the investor to select a reputable developing nation.  
In addition, the low costs of resources in a developing nation, particularly labor can yield 
higher levels of return for the investor as in the case of Tunisia.  A study conducted by 
the World Bank looked into developing nations, specifically Tunisia, a small country in 
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the continent of Africa, and its ability to attract FDI in its service sector.  The decision of 
the Tunisian government to reduce service barriers led to foreign investors competing 
among themselves to invest FDI in this once war-stricken developing nation.   
This study revealed strong correlations of a credible government working with 
foreign investors to increase the levels of FDI in the service sector leading to economic 
growth (Konan and Maskus 2004).  This comes to show a good example of a developing 
nation with the potential to improve its economy through policy changes in its 
governmental structure can truly attract foreign investments in all sectors equally.   
 Another important sector attributed to the increase of a developing nation‟s 
economy is the manufacturing industry.  There are some advantages of FDI in this sector, 
such as the low costs of producing a commodity relative to production in an 
industrialized nation.  In addition, the literature does provide strong evidence of FDI in 
developing nations‟ manufacturing industries that lead to improvements of economic 
growth.  A good example of this case is Mexico.  Besides its geographic location, Mexico 
collaborates with its northern neighbors in many business ventures, primarily the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which is an agreement signed by all three 
North American governments creating a tri-lateral trade bloc to utilize the resources each 
nation possess most of.  Since 1992, many corporations from both Canada and US have 
relocated its factories in Mexico for the purpose of minimizing overhead costs and 
maximizing profits.  Figure 4 provides an example of how NAFTA became an important 
market for U.S. exports of agricultural goods.   
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Figure 4: U.S. Exports of Agricultural Goods 
 
The Mexican economy has experienced an improvement in its economic growth 
at a rate of 15.5% since the ratification of NAFTA in 1994, primarily in its manufacturing 
sector as these so called Maquiladoras are able to import raw materials and produce 
goods for exports (Hufbauer 2005).  Figure 5 provides the graph of Mexican 
manufacturing from 1987 – 2005. 
Figure 5: Mexico’s Manufacturing Output 
 
 Despite Mexico‟s corruption perception index rank of 72 out of 180 countries, its 
government structure is closely similar to that of the US, which includes three branches 
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of government and a separation of powers.  This type of government structure has already 
established itself as a true model of a government worldwide, and is the choice for most 
industrialized nations to implement in developing nations. Mexico‟s Democratic-
Republic government has set forth its credibility in the international community as a 
reputable country to conduct business with, especially since the NAFTA ratification.  
Foreign investors do feel confident that their FDI will be safe and more importantly, 
protected from political corruption and tyranny.  This is just one of the many examples of 
how a developing nation can improve its economy through attracting FDI in its industries 
with strong institutions.  However, the last sector has been a popular topic for debate 
whether it does lead to an improvement of economic growth, or if it is a curse yielding 
high levels of political corruption and tyranny.   
 The mining sector has been seen as a catch twenty-two, in that depending on the 
developing nation it can reap positive or negative economic gains.  It is also determined 
whether there are strong institutions present or absent in a developing nation.  
Nevertheless, a wide array of literature in the resource curse theory has been examined by 
both sides of the aisle with surprisingly different results.  However, both proponents and 
opponents of this theory did share one common denominator, which essentially 
determined a cursed or blessed government.   
 The proponents of this theory have argued that a developing nation‟s abundance 
of resources can actually impact its economic potential and slow down economic growth 
(Sachs and Warner 2001).  Numerous case studies of developing nations have been 
observed and conclude that the abundance of resources correlates with high levels of 
corruption, thus low levels of economic activity.  An example of this phenomenon is the 
forest industry in south Asian countries where rentier states are common, which in turn 
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charge foreign investors high levels of rent for extracting its resources, thereby increasing 
the levels of collusion among public leaders (Ross 2001).  This combination can prove to 
be detrimental to a developing nation‟s ability to sustain economic growth as the 
temptation of public leaders to continually increase rents from foreign investors will only 
hamper the free market system leading to inefficient business practices.  Moreover, this 
inefficiency will host an unfavorable environment for the populace as collusion is likely 
to occur from unethical practices, thus creating a small set of cronies that receives the 
private goods intended to be redistributed to the public.  While proponents argue that the 
resource curse theory is inevitable in developing nations with an abundance of resources, 
proponents counter these arguments by focusing on one key factor.   
 Opponents of the resource curse theory have found a negative relationship 
between developing nations‟ abundance of resources and the strength of its institutions.  
The rent-seeking literature provides a good explanation of the resource curse theory in 
that scholars argue that a developing nation with an abundance of resources, plus the 
inclusion of weak institutions will lead to corruption (Krueger 1974).  Therefore, there is 
a consensus in the field that the resource curse theory can be beneficial to a developing 
nation with an abundance of resources if and only if strong institutions are present.  
Otherwise, the developing nations with weak institutions will only experience higher 
levels of corruption.  This key factor, institutions proves to be vital in the resource curse 
literature as developing nations that can strengthen its institutions, such as enforce the 
rule of law will minimize rent-seeking activities, which is an ingredient to the corruption 
recipe (Bhagwatti 1984).   
 In essence, both proponents and opponents of the resource curse theory can agree 
that with the presence of strong institutions, corruption can be minimized in a developing 
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nation.  The argument makes sense as strong institutions, such as the rule of law will 
make it more challenging for public leaders to rent resources in the mining industry to 
foreign investors without the consent of the people.  Further, strong institutions enable a 
check and balance system as corrupt public leaders that are exposed committing unethical 
activities can face political turmoil be it impeachment and/or conviction.  Hence, the cost-
benefit analysis for a public leader to uphold and abide by the rule of law is greater than 
the cost of political suicide.   
 Although developing nations will not always dramatically restructure its 
governance and rule of law overnight, there have been a few examples of developing 
nations that took the extra effort and experienced economic growth.  Botswana, a small 
southern nation in the African continent is a democratic republic. Since its declaration of 
independence in 1966, it has experienced high levels of economic prosperity due to its 
abundance of resources, such as diamonds, gold, and uranium.  However, it has been able 
to minimize corruption low relative to its neighboring countries due to its strong 
institutions governing the rule of law, thus it has been a model for all African countries to 
adopt and emulate (Acemoglu et. al 2002).  Here is one clear winner that both proponents 
and opponents of the resource curse theory can agree on.  Botswana is a successful 
developing nation with an abundance of resources, but able to retract the temptation of 
rent-seeking activities due to its strong institutions.  In essence, the resource curse theory 
applies to developing nations that have weak institutions where the rule of law is low or 
absent (Mehlum et. al 2006).  Most scholars agree that a developing nation‟s rule of law 
definitely is an important variable in attracting FDI and experience economic growth, but 
many argue how it is defined and measured.  
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 The total population of a country can be utilized as a rough estimate of potential 
consumers to purchase products and services manufactured by foreign direct investment 
(Banga 2003).  The combination of increasing levels of GDP per capita and total 
population could provide an incentive for investors to find a target market in the country, 
thereby cutting some costs from exporting goods abroad.  A population that experiences 
rising levels of income attracts foreign capital accumulation.  Recent studies, such as 
Feng‟s (2003) empirical work on political institutions show political variables with 
respect to FDI can explain the attraction of foreign capital in developing countries.  In 
addition to the extent of economic literature, there is also an established political 
literature on FDI.  Recent studies focusing on governmental corruption through bribes 
and extortion have provided the framework on FDI suggesting an inverse relation 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2008).  Hence, it is essential for any country to 
establish a government, regardless of ideology or political structure that is accountable to 
the people.  For example, some governments choose to take the road to democracy are 
more likely to promote individual freedoms, civil liberties, and civil rights.  In such 
societies, constitutional laws ensure protection for investors from arbitration making a 
much more favorable environment for investments.  The ability of a government to 
uphold these laws can be related to increased FDI levels suggesting that a stable political 
environment is less likely to experience political coups or revolutions (Harms and 
Ursprung 2002). The FDI literature sheds light to multiple political variables that show 
strong correlations with economic growth.  Scholars argue that for developing nations to 
experience positive levels of economic prosperity, its institution must adopt and enforce 
certain practices.  Some examples include implementing a constitution that gives civil 
liberties to its people as it is seen as the main organ of a free nation.  Other examples 
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include a restructuring of government into a democracy where the populace is free to vote 
for the persons to represent them. This is more of the popular belief in the literature as we 
have seen countless public leaders, such as U.S presidents who implemented their 
presidential doctrines to democratized developing nations. Other theories, such as the 
Democratic Peace theory also supports this argument that peace can be achieved between 
democratic nations due to the populace‟s recognition that wars destroys economies, thus 
being able to concentrate on its economy through the free market exchange. Lastly, some 
scholars argue that a developing nation can be non-democratic and still be able to attract 
FDI to increase economic growth.  However, the key factor in the latter argument is that 
these developing nations must have low levels of corruption in their country to be able to 
attract foreign investors.   
 Lastly, a government‟s political capacity is the most important indicator for 
attracting FDI.  The government‟s ability to extract resources from its people, such as 
taxes, can provide its society with a better financial system, hence developing its 
economy.  Recent studies have shown a consistent trend of political capacity and 
economic growth (Feng 2003), while other studies measure the levels of political 
extraction and political reach in sub-national levels suggesting positive effects on FDI 
(Johnson 2007).  They report that political capacity is statistically significant with both 
economic and political variables, and might be a better measurement than traditional 
factors, such as GDP and military expenditures (Singer 1960).  Further, a wide range of 
researches have allowed the popularity of political capacity to be used in many sub-fields, 
such as population, fertility, and mortality rates (Kugler, Feng, and Zak 2000) reporting 
consistent findings.  In addition, political capacity has been used in testing a 
government‟s ability to decrease inflation (Alacazar 1997) as well as its ability to 
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implement a wide range of policies (Snyder 2000).  This reassures investors that their 
capital is protected by a financially-sound market system reinforcing the notion of a 
strong and stable political system.  Political capacity is indeed very dynamic and 
powerful, and could be the key to finally solve the puzzle of what attracts FDI in 
developing countries.     
As a nation establishes a constitution that is accountable to its people and 
promotes individual freedoms ensuring protection from arbitration, it becomes a viable 
recipient of foreign investors.  The ability of an institution to uphold the rule of law, such 
as strong civil liberties has enabled consistent flows of FDI due to the likelihood of a 
stable political environment that will not lead to coups or a revolution.  In addition, 
financial institutions appear to be attracted by countries in which civil and political 
freedoms are respected (Harms and Ursprung 2002).   
 The rule of law can also be extended through a developing nation‟s willingness to 
provide transparency.  For an institution to be able to provide the public access to its 
records of public funds is an important first step to invite foreign investors.  This will 
then enable investors to have a peace of mind knowing that the FDI invested into the 
nation will not be used for personal gains, rent-seeking, or special interests.  Hence, it is 
up to the government to uphold and sustain a greater sense of transparency to financial 
institutions as there is a credible commitment involved among the parties (Cerdenia 
2001).  Moreover, this makes the government accountable to its people by screening 
financial institutions, such as multinational corporations (MNCs) that are credible and 
reputable in investment standards minimizing the likelihood of corrupt practices.  The 
rule of law encompasses many attributes within an institution, but some scholars argue 
that the rule of law has a small affect in the overall outcome of economic prosperity.        
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 There have been several case studies that show democratized nations are able to 
attract FDI and increase levels of economic growth, but for the most part, a democratized 
nation does not guarantee strong institutions to enforce the rule of law.  The notion that a 
democracy is a sufficient reason to invest in should be of concern as we have seen many 
examples of developing nations that have democratized for the sake of democratization, 
but with weak institutions.   
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 In order to understand the data set, we tested three developing countries‟ 
provincial governments from 1994-2000. The collection of data proved to be quite 
challenging as there were several occasions that led to simply nowhere. China, India, and 
Indonesia were chosen for its diverse set of political and economical policies as well as 
their strengths as future global superpowers. There is a growing consensus that the Asian 
continent is starting to show its prowess and ability to dominate the international markets. 
It will be a matter of time for each of these countries to take its rightful place on the 
throne.  
 We employed an Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) regression to determine the 
correlation of variables. We have a sufficient amount of observations collected and also 
feel sufficient to carryout this research, especially considering the lack of literature in the 
sub-national field. We found interesting results only to reinforce our hypothesis that an 
interaction between a country‟s RPC and an economic variable is needed to attract FDI.  
 We can expect to run several models using FDI as the dependent variable and 
hope to find consistency throughout the regression analyses. We expect to conclude that 
RPC alone in these three countries is not enough to attract FDI, rather there needs to be 
an interaction between FDI and economic growth to do so. However, there are several 
works in the RPC literature that provides the framework of the importance of RPC as an 
independent variable alone, such as the works from Kugler, Feng, and Zak with their 
POFED model, and Arbetman and Johnson, so we must acknowledge the importance of 
RPC as a dynamic variable. Nevertheless, there are the works of Kugler and Cohen who 
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have provided their model similar to ours in that RPC alone is insufficient in effectively 
attracting FDI, hence an interaction variable is needed.  
 An issue worth considering is the sub-national data each provincial government 
represents. The argument here states that provincial governments may not have the 
wherewithal needed to effectively carryout political and economical policies in attracting 
FDI.  Examples of this would be an incompetent government that is able to collect 
resources, such as taxes from its people, but does not in turn use their extraction to create 
a lucrative economic environment for investors. This would be a disincentive for 
potential investors to invest its capital as there is no assurance of a safety net for 
investing.  
 Our first model will include all three developing countries and its respective 
provincial governments. We will analyze the independent variables to assess its 
effectiveness on FDI, primarily the interaction variable between RPC and GDP. The 
interaction variable is very important as it can provide compelling analyses in terms of 
policies to developing countries. We hope to find this variable both positive and highly 
significant, thereby stating that RPC alone is insufficient for provincial governments to 
attract FDI, rather needs to interact with an economic variable to make a more favorable 
investing environment.  
 The interaction variable is one of the highlights of this research as there is 
consistency from the works of Kugler and Cohen in their interaction model.  Further, it 
provides the tools necessary for provincial governments in developing countries to 
achieve their goals of economic growth and stability.  The interaction should suggest that 
these governments have both the political and economic policies in place, thereby 
effectively extracting the resources from its people, but being able to implement 
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economic policies that improves the overall welfare of the province.  This is truly a 
favorable environment for investors to consider investing in as there are assurances that a 
government will not promote corrupt acts, default on its loans, and/or implode through 
civil unrest.  We have seen numerous examples of developing countries throughout the 
world with one or more of these attributes, from Tunisia to Libya, among others. 
The next independent variable is GDP.  We expect to find a significant and 
positive correlation between FDI and GDP, thereby supporting the growth literature.  
Many studies, such as Feng‟s work has tested the ability of developing countries‟ strength 
of GDP in determining the likelihood of attracting foreign investments.  If GDP is stable 
and growing, it is a very good sign that the overall welfare of a country is improving, 
thereby sending credible signs of sound economic policies to the international 
community.  
 The next independent variable is Democracy.  We expect democracy to support 
the growth literature as well considering that it is the type of governmental system that 
gives supreme power to the people, hence we expect high levels of civil liberties and civil 
rights, which are very appealing to international investors.  However, it is important to 
note that there are many types of democracies, so this type of governmental system varies 
from country to country.  We see a good number of democracies in the world, but are not 
necessarily free in terms of civil liberties and civil rights, so we need to take this into 
account.  Not to mention the differences between developing and developed nations can 
also impact its abilities to effectively attract FDI, so democracy can either help or hurt an 
economy depending on many political and social attributes.  Nevertheless, a country 
considered to be non-democratic might have more of a challenge in effectively attracting 
FDI.  Moreover, a country that chooses to democratize itself without the proper 
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institutions can lead to a stagnant government does not invest in its human capital system, 
thereby severely dampening its economic opportunities.  A good indicator of this is the 
increasing poverty levels of a province.  Again, a government can effectively extract 
resources from its people, but if it chooses to pursue personal policies and reward cronies 
through private goods then it becomes a disservice for economic growth.  We see a lot of 
examples similar to this, especially that of African nations, such as Zimbabwe where 
poverty levels are on the rise not to mention its uncontrollable inflation rates and its 
current dictator, Robert Mugabe.  We want to prevent a developing country from 
becoming a democracy like this as it will only hamper its economic abilities.  
 We hope to find democracy to be significant and positively affecting FDI.  There 
is also the possibility of several provinces in each country that is remotely isolated from 
traditional urban and metropolitan areas where governments do a much better job 
exercising democracy through elections and social services. In addition, provincial 
governments that are hundreds of miles away from the closest urban area might fall into 
the category of tribal governments with its own rules of laws.  This can lead to the 
extraction of resources, but in an ineffective manner as tribal leaders may have little 
incentive in implementing political and economical policies.  Further, we expect to see a 
consistency in the literature that urban and metropolitan areas do exercise democracy 
much more effectively, such as the growing levels of education attainment and income 
per capita for both men and women versus that of rural areas.  We see two metropolitan 
provinces that epitomize these indicators: Beijing and Guizhou.  
 The last independent variable included in the first model will be Open Economy.  
Our model takes into account the levels of a country‟s ability to privatize its primary, 
secondary, and tertiary sectors.  We have created a continuum model to gauge exactly 
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where each provincial government belongs to by looking at its total expenditures in each 
privatize sector.  
Figure 6: Issue Continuum for Open Economy 
1 
Partially Close Economy 
Low levels of Primary, 
Secondary, and Tertiary 
<100 million 
25 
Partially Open 
Low to Medium levels  of 
Primary, Secondary, and 
Tertiary 
101-300 million 
50 
Midway Open 
Medium levels Primary, 
Secondary, and Tertiary 
301-650 million 
75 
Opening Economy 
Medium to High levels of 
Primary, Secondary, and 
Tertiary 
651-999 million 
100 
Open Economy 
High levels of Primary, 
Secondary, and Tertiary 
>1 billion 
 
Depending on how much each province spends on privatization, whether mining, 
manufacturing, and/or services, they will determine the level of economic openness.  This 
is very important for many reasons, especially to investors as they want to ensure that 
their investments are in a safe place with the hopes of high returns, so it is no surprise to 
see provinces with an open economy levels of 75-100 attract the most FDI. Another 
reason why this is important for economic development is because a country‟s economic 
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openness can determine how ineffective/effective its government is governing.  An open 
economy level indicator of 75-100 provides the substance that the ruling government in a 
developing country is at best trying to implement effective economic policies to jumpstart 
its economy, thereby putting its resources in industries such as its mining, manufacturing, 
and/or services sectors.  
These attempts indirectly send the credible commitments to investors that it is 
perfectly safe to put their capital in a country.  We would like to see each provincial 
government with levels of 75-100, but many provinces find themselves in remote areas 
where infrastructures are absent not to mention low levels of RPC, which signifies an 
ineffective governance of the ruling party.  We hope the model supports the literature that 
economic openness is a good indicator in attracting FDI.  
The next model will break down each individual country in the following order: 
China, India, and Indonesia.  We hope to find consistency with all three countries in that 
RPC alone is insufficient in effectively attracting FDI, but needs an interaction with an 
economic variable. We also hope that the other independent variables will be consistent 
and support the literature.  We expect GDP to be positive and significant in each 
developing country as they have proved to be a rising and dominant force in Asia, 
especially considering that all three countries combined has a GDP value of over fifteen 
trillion dollars, which is more than the U.S.  It should be no surprise to see how these 
three countries are improving the standard of living for its society as we have seen its 
gross domestic product per capita (GDP per capita) also rising.  However, with that said, 
we have to take note of how different each country is in terms of political and economic 
history, and how each developing country has gotten where they are today. 
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We also expect to see Democracy consistent with our first model, so this is where 
the developing countries differ.  We expect to see our China model to have a negative 
correlation between FDI and non-democracy as the expectation in the field is that 
democracies are the better form of government allowing supreme power to rest in the 
hands of the people.  In addition, we know that India is the largest democracy in the 
world with well over 1.1 billion people and growing, and Indonesia is the most populous 
Muslim country in the world, so both should have no problem attracting FDI due to its 
democratic style of governing.  Although China is non-democratic nationally, we know 
its provincial governments exercise a larger degree of democracy than usual.  We see 
provincial governments, such as Guangdong and Jiangsu with tremendous amounts of 
FDI as two dominant cities: Hong Kong and Shanghai have attracted international 
investors to continually invest capital pursuing new venture projects.   
 Lastly, we expect Open Economy to be consistent with our first model as it is a 
compliment in what it takes to effectively attract FDI.  It would be nearly impossible and 
shocking to find provincial governments with closed economies attracting foreign 
investments.  Rather, we assume that international investors tend to be more risk-averse, 
especially during challenging financial times like what we are experiencing today, hence 
would not consider investing in a developing country with a closed economy.  Plus, a 
partially closed economy indicates that the ruling government has little or no interest in 
importing and exporting goods and services to other countries, so it is very rare to find 
true closed economies nowadays.  This would truly be a disincentive for international 
investors as they themselves would be very limited to what they can, and more 
importantly, cannot do in that developing country.  
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 Overall, we hope to find consistency in our models with the correct theoretical 
signs and high significance levels as this would prove to be vital as a policy tool that 
developing countries can adopt and implement in its efforts to effectively attract FDI.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 
Our analyses imply that RPC alone does not necessarily attract FDI in provincial 
governments of developing nations, but rather RPC needs another variable, more precise, 
an economic variable to effectively appeal to international investors.  Therefore, we 
added GDP as an interaction variable with RPC, and found interesting results.  Our 
models suggest that this interaction variable is very viable in attracting FDI as it is both 
positive and significant for all countries as well as for each individual country.  Further, 
our analyses imply that developing countries can effectively attract FDI so long as their 
governments extract resources from its people to promote economic policies improving 
the overall welfare of its province.  
 Model 1 includes FDI as the dependent variable, while GDP, RPC*GDP, 
Democracy, and Open Economy are the independent variables. Model 1 provides the 
following. 
Model 1: All Countries 
                                                                              
       _cons    -71.52573   15.17239    -4.71   0.000    -101.3375     -41.714
        Open     .5768624    .290895     1.98   0.048     .0052923    1.148433
         Dem     44.00503    14.9763     2.94   0.003     14.57858    73.43147
      RPCGDP     12.56402   7.069351     1.78   0.076    -1.326316    26.45436
         GDP     35.70257   6.554204     5.45   0.000     22.82443    48.58071
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    12693283.4   489  25957.6349           Root MSE      =  107.49
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.5549
    Residual    5603705.53   485   11554.032           R-squared     =  0.5585
       Model    7089577.92     4  1772394.48           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,   485) =  153.40
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     490
. regress  FDI GDP RPCGDP Dem Open
 
Model 1 includes all provincial governments from the three developing nations: 
China, India, and Indonesia.  It is no surprise to find GDP to be positive and significant, 
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which supports the growth literature as developing nations try to make strides in the 
international community to become an economic powerhouse.  We find that a one percent 
change in GDP will lead to a thirty-five million dollar increase to FDI.  Our three 
developing countries have done very well as we see China with a GDP of over ten trillion 
dollars, while India with over four trillion dollars, and Indonesia with over one trillion 
dollars.  The International Monetary Fund also ranks each country overall as number two, 
five, and fifteen, respectively hence we can expect GDP to continue to be an effective 
variable in attracting FDI.  Moreover, our results indicate that fifty-six percent of the 
variance is explained, which is a good sign that our variables do indeed have an impact 
on FDI.  
Model 1 excluded RPC as it was negative and insignificant implying that 
governments with high levels of extraction detract FDI and does not necessarily impact 
economic policies.  Figure 7 provides the regression analysis. 
Figure 7: Model 1 Including RPC 
                                                                              
       _cons    -68.46979    19.4352    -3.52   0.000    -106.6576     -30.282
        Open     .5731089   .2915571     1.97   0.050      .000235    1.145983
         Dem      44.2538   15.02325     2.95   0.003     14.73494    73.77265
      RPCGDP     13.83407   8.687737     1.59   0.112    -3.236266    30.90441
         GDP     34.64317   7.792103     4.45   0.000     19.33264     49.9537
         RPC    -3.179844    12.6194    -0.25   0.801    -27.97542    21.61573
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    12693283.4   489  25957.6349           Root MSE      =  107.59
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.5540
    Residual     5602970.5   484  11576.3853           R-squared     =  0.5586
       Model    7090312.95     5  1418062.59           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5,   484) =  122.50
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     490
. regress  FDI RPC GDP RPCGDP Dem Open
 
Therefore, RPC needs to be combined with an economic variable.  The interaction 
variable between RPC and GDP is positive and significant.  We found that a one percent 
change in the interaction variable of RPC*GDP will increase FDI by twelve million 
dollars.  This implies that governments that effectively extract resources from its people 
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needs to do so in a manner where the economic policies are geared towards increasing the 
living standards of its country; this is what will appeal to international investors.  It is not 
enough to simply collect taxes on a regular basis and expect FDI to flow into the 
economy as there is no commitment made by the government to improve economic 
development.  International investors are smart and will see right through a government 
failing to make these commitments.  
We see this interaction variable as a necessary step in enabling provincial 
governments to effectively attract FDI.  This becomes a very important policy tool for 
many developing countries as it provides them an opportunity to participate in the 
international economy of foreign investments.  We do not have to expect a country to 
simply experience a revolution and/or conduct a political coup to remove the current 
government; rather we need to see the current government make a commitment in 
improving the living standards of its people.  This would suffice the ability to appeal to 
the international community as a credible country thereby attracting FDI.  We have also 
found that an open economy is an important determinant in attracting FDI.  
An open economy allows several things to occur, namely the exchange of goods 
through both imports and exports to the international community, and also, the credible 
signal to international investors about the opportunities for maximizing growth and 
profits.  We found that a one percent change in an open economy will lead to a five 
hundred thousand dollar increase to FDI.  This is consistent with the literature as we find 
open economies a better and safer place for investments than closed economies.  In 
addition, international investors would not risk their capital knowing that a developing 
country has not opened up its borders to trade as the incentives in doing so is absent; why 
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risk the possibility of zero returns in a closed economy where the likelihood of an 
authoritarian regime exists?  
Moreover, our analysis suggests that the type of governmental system does matter 
when attracting FDI as our results suggests that autocracies have a negative impact than 
do democracies.  We find that a one percent change in democracy will lead to a forty-four 
million dollar increase to FDI while a one percent change in autocracy will lead to a 
seventy-one million dollar decrease to FDI.  We see China as a communist style country 
ruled by an authoritarian regime while both India and Indonesia‟s governmental systems 
are considered to be a democratic republic.  However, we should take note that China is 
very different compared to the average communist style authoritarian system, such as 
Laos and Vietnam. Where China is a massive growing nation with record level growth 
rates, military and technological capabilities, Laos and Vietnam are plagued with high 
levels of corruption and political instability.  
Since our variables vary in terms of measurement, it is important to note that we 
need to include standardized coefficients to better assess our model.  Figure 8 provides us 
model 1 with beta coefficients.  
Figure 8: Model 1 with Beta Coefficients 
                                                                              
       _cons    -71.52573   15.17239    -4.71   0.000                        .
        Open     .5768624    .290895     1.98   0.048                 .1249411
         Dem     44.00503    14.9763     2.94   0.003                  .134681
      RPCGDP     12.56402   7.069351     1.78   0.076                  .168294
         GDP     35.70257   6.554204     5.45   0.000                 .5624133
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    12693283.4   489  25957.6349           Root MSE      =  107.49
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.5549
    Residual    5603705.53   485   11554.032           R-squared     =  0.5585
       Model    7089577.92     4  1772394.48           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,   485) =  153.40
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     490
. regress  FDI GDP RPCGDP Dem Open, beta
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It is expected that GDP does have the strongest weight on FDI at 0.56 relative to the other 
variables, but one interesting point to make is to note the interaction variable at 0.16, 
which is higher than the other variables of Democracy and Open Economy, 0.13 and 
0.12, respectively. This again highlights the importance of the interaction variable as a 
powerful tool to influence FDI at the provincial level of a developing county.  
Now, let us take a look at each of the variables in a graph format to determine the 
effectiveness of the dataset. From a snapshot picture, we can see the correlation matrix 
for all variables regressed from Model 1, and notice some interesting things.  
Graph 1: Correlation Matrix of Model 1 
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We can note that there are some issues with the individual graphs of FDI and our 
independent variables, so we need to take a closer look at necessary steps to fix our 
dataset. Looking at both FDI and GDP, and FDI and RPCGDP, we can see several 
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outliers that can make our overall analyses ineffective, so we will need to test our 
regression to ensure that we have normal distribution, linearity, homoscedasticity, and 
non-multicollinearity. We used the kernel density estimate to see how our variables 
perform in hopes to have a normal distribution.  Graph 2 provides the illustration. 
Graph 2: Kernel Density Estimate of Residuals for Model 1 
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The graph does have minor issues, but we can move forward in our analyses and check 
for linearity.  
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Graph 3: Kernel Density Estimate of GDP for Model 1 
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Graph 4: Kernel Density Estimate of RPCGDP for Model 1 
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It is important to ensure that our regression analysis is linear as it will assist 
provincial governments of developing countries to forecast future economic trends not to 
mention assessing the strength of the variables used for political decisions. We have used 
the augmented partial residual plot to determine how linear our dataset is to successfully 
predict future trends.  Graphs 5, 6, and 7 provide the illustrations.  
Graph 5: ACPR Plot of GDP for Model 1 
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This graph does start out fairly well until we see GDP increase over eight billion dollars, 
but this is expected considering GDP is income that can exponentially increase each year, 
especially for a country.  We need to take note that there are a few outliers that is causing 
this graph to be non-linear, so we have taken the step to take the log of GDP in hopes of 
correcting the linearity issue.  Graph 6 provides the illustration.    
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Graph 6: ACPR Plot of logGDP for Model 1 
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This graph does do a better job relative to graph 5 in terms of linearity.  However, it is 
important to note that by taking the natural log of GDP into the model, it makes our 
interaction variable of RPCGDP statistically insignificant.  One option to consider is to 
drop the variable GDP altogether as we would still achieve our desired results.  
Nevertheless, this is one issue we need to take note for future references as we may need 
to revisit our dataset to ensure that we do not have missing variables. 
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Graph 7: ACPR Plot of RPCGDP for Model 1 
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The same issue here arises as RPCGDP also exponentially increases after reaching six.  
We have also taken the step to log our variable in hopes to find a more linear regression.  
Graph 8 provides the illustration.  Since RPCGDP is our main variable, we need to keep 
this in its proper form.  
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Graph 8: ACPR Plot of logRPCGDP for Model 1 
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This graph also does a better job relative to the graph 7, but like what was mentioned 
earlier, we cannot omit nor change our main variable in our model, so for the purpose of 
experimentation, this graph was included to determine the effectiveness of our interaction 
variable in natural log form, and indeed, it does provide a better linear picture than our 
original data.  
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Graph 9: ACPR Plot of Open Economy for Model 1 
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This graph does provide the linearity requirement needed to forecast future trends along 
with assessing the strength of an open economy to attract FDI.  It is important to note that 
provincial governments in developing countries must be able to take the necessary steps 
in opening its economy, more likely in the realm of political decisions, such as policies of 
free trade.  We do see this example in our dataset as all three developing countries chosen 
have opened up its economies through a range of free trade policies since the mid-
twentieth century.  However, it is also important to note that each developing countries 
economic success rate varies relative to each other as each one faced different 
circumstances throughout its governing tenure.     
The next step is to test for homoscedasticity as this will validate our statistical 
testing that our variances are uncorrelated.  Graph 10 provides the illustration.  
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Graph 10: Residuals vs. Fitted Values 
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In addition, we also included a heteroscedasticity test called Breusch-Pagan and found 
our chi square to be extremely large and significant, which figure 9 indicates that we have 
heteroscedasticity in our analysis.   
Figure 9: BP Test for Heteroscedasticity 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =  1339.70
         Variables: fitted values of FDI
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
 
 
Hence, we ran our regression model with robust standard errors to fix this issue.  Figure 
10 illustrates the new regression analysis.  
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Figure 10: Model 1 with Robust Standard Errors 
                                                                              
       _cons    -71.52573   13.72583    -5.21   0.000    -98.49517   -44.55628
        Open     .5768624   .3920386     1.47   0.142    -.1934415    1.347166
         Dem     44.00503   11.29569     3.90   0.000      21.8105    66.19956
      RPCGDP     12.56402   10.06488     1.25   0.213    -7.212124    32.34017
         GDP     35.70257   10.37155     3.44   0.001     15.32385    56.08129
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  107.49
                                                       R-squared     =  0.5585
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,   485) =   43.70
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     490
. regress FDI GDP RPCGDP Dem Open, r
 
There seems to be an issue with our interaction variable as it is now considered 
insignificant.  This forces us to be creative with our dataset, and see what happens when 
we omit one independent variable, GDP.  There is also the fear of multicollinearity, so it 
would make sense to drop the GDP variable to ensure that our analysis is indeed valid.  
Figure 11 provides the illustration.   
Figure 11: Model 1 without GDP  
                                                                              
       _cons    -85.41803   16.11135    -5.30   0.000    -117.0745   -53.76153
        Open     1.217187   .3322728     3.66   0.000     .5643185    1.870056
         Dem     53.07678   13.09901     4.05   0.000     27.33909    78.81447
      RPCGDP     45.45263   9.295288     4.89   0.000     27.18871    63.71654
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  110.62
                                                       R-squared     =  0.5315
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   486) =   51.91
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     490
. regress FDI RPCGDP Dem Open, r
 
We can clearly see a stronger relationship with our dependent and independent variables.  
Also, the result is statistically significant with higher levels than that of model 1 with 
GDP included.  Further, we can see our interaction variable, RPCGDP as the strongest 
variable to attract FDI, so we can suggest that this model does provide validity.  Lastly, 
we need to test for multicollinearity.   
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 It is also very important to ensure that our variables are independent of each other 
and does not cause correlation as we want to ensure accuracy throughout the regression 
process.  We tested for multicollinearity by using the variance inflation factor and figure 
12 provides the illustration.  Since model 1 includes GDP and RPCGDP, we assumed that 
multicollinearity is present due to the close relation between these variables, so we 
omitted GDP for the purpose of ensuing our regression analysis is both valid and 
accurate.   
Figure 12: Variance Inflation Inflator for Model 1 
    Mean VIF        2.86
                                    
         Dem        2.28    0.438679
      RPCGDP        2.67    0.375156
        Open        3.65    0.274061
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
 
We can suggest that we do not have multicollinearity present in our dataset as our 
variance inflation inflator is well under four.  Our regression analysis is indeed stable.  It 
seems that our initial model did provide important information regarding a provincial 
government‟s ability to effectively attract FDI.  Moreover, our regression analysis 
suggests that the interaction variable is indeed sufficient in jumpstarting economic 
growth.  This is perhaps the missing piece of the mystery as to why many provincial 
governments cannot compete with other provinces not to mention other emerging markets 
worldwide.  There must be the commitment by the provincial government to implement 
economic and political policies for a more open domestic economy in order for foreign 
capital to flow in.  We will now see how our model performs in each individual 
developing country.   
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China has proved to be a powerful developing country since the mid-to-late 
twentieth century as it consistently experienced record growth rates well above the U.S.  
Further, it consists of over thirty provinces, which ranges dramatically from rural to 
metropolitan areas, thus making it a challenge to aggregate economical and political 
variables.  Nevertheless, each province is unique with its own characteristics and traits 
that only contribute to the overall welfare of the nation.  
 We expect China to be consistent with the literature in this study as it is the main 
driving force in effectively attracting FDI.  We see that consistency in the model as RPC 
is insignificant, but the interaction variable, RPC*GDP is positive and significant 
therefore we will omit RPC in Model 2.  We find that a one percent change in China‟s 
RPC*GDP will lead to a twenty-four million dollar increase in FDI. We have an R-square 
of fifty percent, which is also a good indicator that our variables explain FDI.   
Model 2: China 
                                                                              
       _cons    -105.5238   25.05403    -4.21   0.000    -154.9292   -56.11831
        Open     1.061893   .4870325     2.18   0.030     .1014859      2.0223
      RPCGDP     24.15975   12.37287     1.95   0.052    -.2390118    48.55852
         GDP     26.65003   11.04906     2.41   0.017     4.861765    48.43829
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    10463908.6   202  51801.5277           Root MSE      =  161.96
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4936
    Residual    5219755.22   199  26229.9257           R-squared     =  0.5012
       Model    5244153.38     3  1748051.13           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   199) =   66.64
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     203
. reg  FDI GDP RPCGDP Open
 
However, we need to take into account why RPC is insignificant as there is a vast 
difference between the rural west and the metropolitan east.  When we compare two 
distinct provinces on opposite ends of the country, such as Qinghai and Shanghai, we see 
stark difference in their economies and politics.  For example, our data collected for RPC 
gives Qinghai‟s level between 0 and 0.8, while Shanghai is between 1 and 1.3.  This is an 
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indicator that Shanghai‟s government is indeed capable in extracting resources from its 
people and transforming it to effective policies, thereby creating a positive environment 
for investors.  
As for Qinghai, it is adjacent to Xinjiang and Xizang to the west both of which are 
autonomous regions.  This creates a sense of instability among investors due to the 
uncertainty of public leaders, and for that matter a credible government governing those 
areas, which is perhaps an indicator of the low levels of RPC and FDI in Qinghai.  
Whereas Shanghai is located on the east coast adjacent to the Pacific Ocean, thereby 
allowing an easier route for trade and investment as multiple modes of transportation can 
easily go in and out of the province.  Further, Shanghai is considered to be one of the 
largest international mega-ports in the world attracting well over twenty-five billion 
dollars of FDI each year.  
Another factor that could potentially explain RPC‟s insignificance is that of 
incapable governments.  Take the example of Jiangsu and Shanghai. Both provinces 
border each other in the east coast, but have different RPC and FDI levels.  Unlike 
Shanghai, where its government is considered capable in extracting resources from its 
people, Jiangsu‟s RPC is between 0 and 0.8 similar levels to that of Qinghai.  This can 
imply Jiangsu‟s government‟s inability to effectively extract resources from its people 
relative to Shanghai, regardless of geographical location.  We could assume that both 
provinces should have the same RPC and FDI levels, but find both between 0 and 0.8 and 
1 and 1.3, and an average of seven and twenty-five billion dollars each year, respectively.  
These factors are worth considering in Model 2, where the results imply RPC levels are 
insignificant.   
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 To extend on Model 2, we find that our variables, RPC*GDP, GDP, and Open 
Economy are indeed positive and significant, and is consistent with Model 1.  Moreover, 
we expect to find GDP as a good indicator to gauge the country‟s overall growth as 
higher levels of GDP would imply a growing economy, hence a growing target market of 
consumers for investors to target.  We find that a one percent change in China‟s GDP will 
lead to a twenty-six million dollar increase in FDI.  We do see China today as the second 
largest economy behind the U.S, but more importantly, its GDP will eventually surpass 
that of the U.S in the next few decades as evidence by several indicators of growth, such 
as the rise of a middle class and capital invested abroad.  
 Lastly, we see the variable Open Economy consistent with the literature as our 
results suggest our coefficients to be positive and significant.  We find that a one percent 
change in China‟s open economy will lead to a one million increase in FDI. Utilizing the 
Issue Continuum, we imply that open economies will attract investors to invest their 
capital as the most of the infrastructures are already provided, such as roads and 
highways, and technology.  Plus, an open economy is a good indicator that the 
government promotes a free market capitalist environment, and not necessarily an iron 
fist of governance, although China itself is a good basket case for the previous statement.  
 Now, we can check for the four rules of regression analysis, and hope that we 
have not violated any of the assumptions.  First, we need to ensure that our variables can 
be assessed in a uniform and consistent manner, so we need to run the model with beta 
coefficients and determine how strong of an indicator our main variable is.  Figure 13 
provides the illustration.   
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Figure 13: Model 2 with Beta Coefficients 
                                                                              
       _cons    -105.5238   25.05403    -4.21   0.000                        .
        Open     1.061893   .4870325     2.18   0.030                 .1519639
      RPCGDP     24.15975   12.37287     1.95   0.052                 .2593623
         GDP     26.65003   11.04906     2.41   0.017                 .3480849
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    10463908.6   202  51801.5277           Root MSE      =  161.96
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4936
    Residual    5219755.22   199  26229.9257           R-squared     =  0.5012
       Model    5244153.38     3  1748051.13           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   199) =   66.64
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     203
. reg  FDI GDP RPCGDP Open, b
 
We do see our interaction variable with roughly twenty-six percent indicating that it does 
have a strong weight in terms of our dependent variable.  With no surprise, GDP also has 
a stronger weight on FDI, which is expected for our model.  Next, we need to check to 
see if our model is normally distributed.   
Graph 11: Correlation Matrix of Model 2 
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Automatically, we see a few issues with our observations, primarily that of 
outliers, so we will need to investigate each of our variables in depth to ensure that our 
analysis is valid.  We will implement the Kernel density estimate to determine if our 
residuals are normally distributed.  Graph 11 provides the illustration.   
Graph 12: Kernel Density Estimate of Residuals for Model 2 
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The graph does depict our residuals to be normally distributed as expected, so we can 
move on to the next test.  We need to ensure that our regression analysis does provide a 
linear relationship for forecasting efforts, so we will implement the augmented partial 
residual plot for each independent variable.  Graphs 12 and 13 provide the illustration.  
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Graph 13: ACPR of GDP for Model 2 
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Similar to model 1, we do see a minor issue with our linearity in that after eight billion 
dollars, the observation exponentially increases.  Again, due to the nature of the income 
variable, this is expected to occur, so one solution to this is to take the natural log of GDP 
then plot it, or to omit GDP altogether.   
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Graph 14: ACPR of RPCGDP for Model 2 
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The linearity issue is also prevalent as was in the previous graph, and we also see a 
consistent pattern in model 1 when all three countries are regressed.  However, since 
RPCGDP is our main variable, we will need to move on, but keep this in mind for future 
references.  Our next test is for heteroscedasticity.  We will plot our residuals relative to 
our predicted values and hope to see constant variation.  Graph 14 provides the 
illustration.  
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Graph 15: Residuals vs. Fitted Values 
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There is definitely a sign of heteroscedasticity in our graph as most of the observations 
are clumped together at the zero level of both x and y axes.  We will take a look at the 
Breusch-Pagan test to ensure our assumption.  Figure 14 provides the results.   
Figure 14: BP Test for Heteroscedasticity 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =   191.51
         Variables: fitted values of FDI
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
 
The Breush-Pagan test does validate that our model is heteroscedastic, hence we need to 
rerun the model with robust standard errors.   
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Figure 15: Model 2 with Robust Standard Errors 
                                                                              
       _cons    -105.5238   17.79594    -5.93   0.000    -140.6166   -70.43094
        Open     1.061893   .4256557     2.49   0.013     .2225182    1.901268
      RPCGDP     24.15975   12.06942     2.00   0.047     .3593812    47.96013
         GDP     26.65003   11.29514     2.36   0.019     4.376494    48.92356
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  161.96
                                                       R-squared     =  0.5012
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   199) =   37.07
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     203
. reg  FDI GDP RPCGDP Open, r
 
We need to note that our variables continue to be statistically significant.  Finally, we can 
check for multicollinearity.  We will run the variance inflation inflator to determine 
whether our model has multicollinearity.  Figure 16 provides the results. 
Figure 16: Variance Inflation Inflator for Model 2 
    Mean VIF        5.76
                                    
        Open        1.94    0.516022
      RPCGDP        7.04    0.142080
         GDP        8.31    0.120359
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
 
Similar to model 1, we did expect both variables GDP and RPCGDP to be highly 
correlated, which is why we have large variance inflation inflator numbers at eight and 
seven, respectively.  The only solution to this issue is to rerun our model omitting GDP.  
And by doing so, we should be able to fix the multicollinearity issue.  Once we omitted 
GDP from the model, we can see our variance inflation inflator improve as figure 17 
provides the results. 
Figure 17: Variance Inflation Inflator for Model 2 without GDP 
    Mean VIF        1.63
                                    
      RPCGDP        1.63    0.612347
        Open        1.63    0.612347
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
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We can now suggest that our model has taken care of the multicollinearity issue.  In 
addition, by omitting the GDP variable, our model 2 has also improved in other avenues, 
namely, normal distribution and linearity.  We will rerun model 2 along with its beta 
coefficients to provide the illustration in figure 18. 
Figure 18: Model 2 without GDP 
                                                                              
       _cons    -120.5288   24.55994    -4.91   0.000    -168.9585   -72.09917
        Open     1.527802    .452441     3.38   0.001     .6356352    2.419968
      RPCGDP     50.31244   6.031247     8.34   0.000     38.41945    62.20543
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    10463908.6   202  51801.5277           Root MSE      =   163.9
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4814
    Residual    5372350.76   200  26861.7538           R-squared     =  0.4866
       Model    5091557.84     2  2545778.92           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   200) =   94.77
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     203
. reg  FDI RPCGDP Open
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -120.5288   24.55994    -4.91   0.000                        .
        Open     1.527802    .452441     3.38   0.001                 .2186385
      RPCGDP     50.31244   6.031247     8.34   0.000                 .5401194
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    10463908.6   202  51801.5277           Root MSE      =   163.9
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4814
    Residual    5372350.76   200  26861.7538           R-squared     =  0.4866
       Model    5091557.84     2  2545778.92           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   200) =   94.77
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     203
. reg  FDI RPCGDP Open, b
 
We do see an improvement from the initial model as our interaction variable is much 
more influential relative to FDI at fifty-four percent compared to nearly twenty-six 
percent.  We also feel confident that our model does not violate the rules of normal 
distribution as graph 15 illustrates the relationship.   
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Graph 16: Pnorm of Model 2 
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We have used the normal distribution technique called the probability normal distribution 
and see that it is fairly consistent from start to finish.  There is a lot to be said about the 
model used for our analyses, primarily that of our interaction variable.  Nevertheless, this 
is one avenue in understanding the vastly complex situation in China as it has 
experienced multiple economic and political policies with different outcomes.     
Since the 1970s, China has opened up its market to the outside world while 
maintaining its political environment as a quasi-communist government with one major 
political party. Investors, such as the U.S were aware of the risks involved in investing in 
a country that was considered a foe with completely opposite political beliefs.  
Nevertheless, the risks were made and the returns proved to be very lucrative for 
investors. Today, China, mainly on its east coast, is well known for its open economy as 
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international trading, primarily its exporting capabilities to both developed and 
developing countries, have dominated the world.  Therefore, China has well over several 
decades of experience in attracting FDI.  It is no surprise to see this variable consistent 
with the growth literature. However, the next country on the list proves to be quite a 
challenge to understand.  
 India is regarded as an emerging economy, although not at the same economic 
levels as China, but a formidable powerhouse indeed in the next century.  It is also the 
largest democracy in the world with well over 1.1 billion people second to that of China. 
Both countries share similar traits, such as geographical location and the number of 
provincial governments.  With over thirty provinces, India is also very unique in that it 
too has its rural and metropolitan areas, and a vast amount of water surrounding it.  
However, it is very much different from China in both its economical and political 
stances.  
 Model 3 provides the information for India with stark results.  
Model 3: 
                                                                              
       _cons     .2409249   2.143979     0.11   0.911    -4.012153    4.494002
        Open     .4478851   .1119237     4.00   0.000     .2258587    .6699115
      RPCGDP     13.64313   6.289281     2.17   0.032     1.166893    26.11938
         GDP    -9.195648   4.539087    -2.03   0.045    -18.19998   -.1913202
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    20966.6564   104  201.602465           Root MSE      =  10.662
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4361
    Residual    11482.2671   101  113.685813           R-squared     =  0.4524
       Model    9484.38927     3  3161.46309           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   101) =   27.81
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     105
. reg  FDI GDP RPCGDP Open
 
We expected its RPC levels to be positive and significant merely due to its democratic 
value, but we found its RPC levels to be negative and insignificant, not to mention only 
forty-three percent of the variance is explained in our model.  This causes some debate in 
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the democracy literature as we assumed that democracies are very capable in governing.  
However, we need to take into account that India is a developing country unlike that of 
the U.S where several variables differ dramatically, such as corruption.  When comparing 
democratic countries based on the Corruption Perception Index, India is given a 3.3 and 
the U.S a 7.1.  The lower the number implies the higher the level of corruption perceived 
in a given country, hence perhaps why India‟s RPC levels are negative.  There is some 
truth to this that although India is indeed capable of extracting resources from its people, 
the perceived corruption has plagued its potential from maximizing its abilities to attract 
FDI.  However, another inconsistency lies in the model as GDP is also negative, but 
significant.  
 Contrary to the growth literature, we expect GDP to be positive and significant for 
a country‟s growth, but in the case of India, it seems as if it is quite the opposite.  We find 
that a one percent change in India‟s GDP will lead to a nine million dollar decrease in 
FDI. Model 3 provides a negative relationship relative to FDI, so this would imply that 
India‟s growing economy alone does not necessarily attract FDI, but is missing 
something.  From one perspective, this makes sense as the CPI has truly plagued India‟s 
appeal to investors, so an increase in economic development may not be enough to give 
investors the signal to invest right away.  We also have to note that India‟s current GDP 
level is four trillion dollars, six trillion less than China.  This may not be convincing 
enough for investors to start investing in this country as economic development is well 
below that of China, and plus, China is the more appealing country for investors.  Further, 
there needs to be some sort of interaction between the ability of a government to extract 
its resources along with its people‟s living standards.  Hence, we included the interaction 
variable between RPC and GDP.  
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 Model 3 provides compelling evidence that RPC and GDP by itself is not enough 
to positively attract FDI, but the interaction of both variables must be present for 
investors to invest in India.  The interaction variable is indeed positive and significant, 
not to mention consistent with the China model, hence making us believe that once 
investors see Indian provincial governments extracting resources from its people for the 
purpose of economic development, in turn would give the signal to investors to invest in 
India.  We find that a one percent change in India‟s RPC*GDP will lead to a thirteen 
million dollar increase in FDI.  This is a powerful implication as we have also seen this 
interaction variable work when all three countries are analyzed.  There is something to be 
said about this as developing countries regardless of its CPI levels can still overcome its 
reputation and attract FDI by showing investors that its government is committed in 
improving economic development through effective policy-making.  The last point to 
make about this interaction variable is that other authors have used similar variables to 
suggest the same goal of attracting FDI, so there is already a growing literature in these 
interaction variables.  
 Model 3 also includes one last variable, which is not a surprise in the growth 
literature.  The variable Open Economy was collected and used to determine its 
consistency in the field, and we found it to be positive and significant in attracting FDI.  
We find that a one percent change in India‟s open economy will lead to a four hundred 
thousand dollar increase in FDI.  This reinforces the notion that developing countries 
need to open up its borders to trade in the international realm in order to attract foreign 
investments.  Now, we can check the model to ensure that it meets the four pillars of 
statistical analysis.  To ensure that our interaction variable does have a significant impact, 
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we ran the regression analysis with beta coefficients, and as figure 19 suggests, our 
interaction variable is the strongest variable to affect FDI.   
Figure 19: Model 3 with Beta Coefficients 
                                                                              
       _cons     .2409249   2.143979     0.11   0.911                        .
        Open     .4478851   .1119237     4.00   0.000                 .5394469
      RPCGDP     13.64313   6.289281     2.17   0.032                 .5994822
         GDP    -9.195648   4.539087    -2.03   0.045                -.4945364
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    20966.6564   104  201.602465           Root MSE      =  10.662
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4361
    Residual    11482.2671   101  113.685813           R-squared     =  0.4524
       Model    9484.38927     3  3161.46309           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   101) =   27.81
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     105
. reg  FDI GDP RPCGDP Open, b
 
One item to note is the negative relationship between FDI and GDP as we expected it to 
be positive, however, unlike models 1 and 2, GDP in model 3 is not as signficant as our 
interaction variable.  It is also important to provide the relationship of our dependent 
variable against our independent variables to see the patterns.  Based on the correlation 
matrix graph, we can see some issues similar to what we experienced in model 2.  Graph 
16 provides the illustration. 
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Graph 17: Correlation Matrix of Model 3 
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There are a few issues with outliers as depicted in the graph, so we need to check that the 
observations do not affect our results.  We will use the kernel density estimate to check 
that our model is normally distributed.  Graph 17 provides the illustration.   
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Graph 18: Kernel Density Estimate of Model 3 
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Our graph does look much better than previous models, and we can suggest that our 
model is normally distributed.  The next test is to determine whether our model fulfills 
the linearity test.  The augmented component plus residual tool was used to determine the 
linearity of each independent variable.  Graphs 18 and 19 provide the illustration. 
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Graph 19: ACPR Plot of GDP for Model 3 
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We can definitely see a linear relationship in this graph, although just to mention what 
was stated earlier, the relationship is indeed a negative one.  Nonetheless, we do see a 
very smooth fitted downward-sloping curve until two where it starts to slowly move away 
from each other.     
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Figure 20: ACPR Plot of RPCGDP for Model 3 
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The augmented component plus residual graph for our interaction variable is also linear 
as we see the slope increase.  There is a minor deviation once the variable reaches two, 
but for the most part, the relationship is indeed linear.  We can rest assure that we have 
fulfilled the second criteria of statistical testing and are ready to test for homoscedasticity.  
Graph 20 provides the illustration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
73 
Graph 21: Residuals vs. Fitted Values 
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Unlike the tests for normal distribution and linearity, we see an issue with 
heteroscedasticity.  The observations seem to cluster at the beginning of the graph then 
randomly spread out.  However, we will need to run the Breusch-Pagan test to make sure 
that it is present in our model.  Figure 20 provides the heteroscedasticity results.   
Figure 20: BP Test for Model 3 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =   100.63
         Variables: fitted values of FDI
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
 
We definitely can reject the hypothesis that our model is homoscedastic.  Therefore, we 
will need to correct this by running our model with robust standard errors.  Figure 21 
provides the results.   
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Figure 22: Robust Standard Errors for Model 3 
                                                                              
       _cons     .2409249   2.034421     0.12   0.906    -3.794819    4.276669
        Open     .4478851    .144118     3.11   0.002     .1619937    .7337765
      RPCGDP     13.64313   7.300044     1.87   0.065    -.8381902    28.12446
         GDP    -9.195648   4.939281    -1.86   0.066    -18.99385     .602558
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  10.662
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4524
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   101) =   10.19
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     105
. reg  FDI GDP RPCGDP Open, r
 
We do see a slight issue when running this model with robust standard errors as both our 
variables, GDP and RPCGDP are now statisticall insignificant at the 95% level.  This can 
cause some concern as our original model suggest that our variables, particularly our 
interaction variable is positively correlated with FDI.  We can either check our 
observations to ensure that we do not have missing observations, or we can simply omit 
GDP in our model as there is the other concern for multicollinearity.  Figure 21 provides 
the test results for multicollinearity.   
Figure 23: Variance Inflation Inflator for Model 3 
    Mean VIF        9.48
                                    
        Open        3.35    0.298380
         GDP       10.99    0.090993
      RPCGDP       14.08    0.070999
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
 
As suspected, we do see a very strong correlation between our independent variables, so 
one technique to solve this issue is to omit GDP.  Figure 22 provides the new variance 
inflation inflator. 
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Figure 24: Variance Inflation Inflator without GDP for Model 3 
    Mean VIF        3.33
                                    
      RPCGDP        3.33    0.300210
        Open        3.33    0.300210
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
 
We now can move on as our model does not show any signs of multicollinearity.  Again, 
we saw this similar issue with models 1 and 2, and omitting GDP from both models 
solved the issue of multicollinearity.  If this trend continues, we can expect it to occur 
again in model 4 for Indonesia.   
We have to keep in mind that regardless of India‟s open economy spanning back 
to its independence from Great Britain in the mid-twentieth century, it took on a 
combination of western style policies with socialist practices, which became known as 
economic socialism.  This did not sit well with investors, as there was the uncertainty of 
what type of economic industry India was going to become, so a cautious optimism 
ensued.  However, the results took several decades long to finally appeal to the 
international community that it is a reputable and safe country to invest in.  Today, India 
is an economic powerhouse, primarily in the realms of service as they provide assistance 
to several developed countries, such as the U.S in many technology related fields.  
Nevertheless, India does need several variables present to effectively attract FDI and 
continue to take its place in the international market as an economic powerhouse rather 
than having an open economy alone as there must be a commitment made by the Indian 
governments to improve economic development.  The last developing country tested is 
Indonesia, and surprisingly had similar results with India.  
 Indonesia like China and India has thirty provinces in this vast archipelago 
system.  And unlike China and India where one of its coasts consist of land and the other 
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water, its provinces are scattered around and all are surrounded by water.  Although there 
are advantages of having water accessibility, it can also hinder economic investments and 
trade as a direct route may be absent not to mention the lack of ports in smaller provinces.  
In our study, we found interesting results with Indonesia closely resembling that of India.  
Model 4 provides the breakdown of each variable used relative to FDI. We also see our 
R-square at 0.65, nearly twice as strong as India‟s R-square.  
Model 4: 
                                                                              
       _cons     .2742575   .1107254     2.48   0.014     .0557541    .4927609
        Open     .1487736   .0178391     8.34   0.000     .1135703    .1839769
      RPCGDP     2.324482   .2439051     9.53   0.000     1.843164      2.8058
         GDP    -2.480185   .6145347    -4.04   0.000    -3.692896   -1.267474
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    743.000255   181  4.10497378           Root MSE      =  1.2074
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.6449
    Residual    259.475922   178   1.4577299           R-squared     =  0.6508
       Model    483.524333     3  161.174778           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   178) =  110.57
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     182
. reg  FDI GDP RPCGDP Open
 
Similar to India, Indonesia‟s RPC level is negative and insignificant, which leads 
us to believe that the same thing happening in India is happening in Indonesia, which 
could be the CPI result.  The CPI level for India is at a 3.3 while Indonesia is at 3.1, so 
the corruption perception is much higher in Indonesia.  This could again possibly explain 
the negative relation to FDI as capable governments may not necessarily know how to 
effectively extract its resources from its people that would in turn lead to effective 
policies, thereby appealing to foreign investors. Another similarity between India and 
Indonesia is their GDP‟s negative and significant relation relative to FDI.  We find that a 
one percent change in Indonesia‟s GDP will lead to a two million dollar decrease in FDI.  
Although the theoretical sign does not support the growth literature, we can conclude by 
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saying that GDP alone is insufficient in attracting FDI.  Nevertheless, this reminds us of 
the importance of an interaction variable between RPC and GDP.  
 The more interesting finding is that of the interaction variable between RPC and 
GDP.  Similar to the results found in China and India, Indonesia is positive and 
significant.  We find that a one percent change in Indonesia‟s RPC*GDP will lead to a 
two million dollar increase in FDI.  This suggests that the interaction variable is 
necessary in attracting FDI into this developing country even though it has been plagued 
by the CPI result.  And to reemphasize the notion of political systems, Indonesia is 
considered to be a democratic republic just like India.  There is something to be said 
about CPI and democracies, which can be further explained in a different research.   
The interaction variable sheds light into why developing countries find it such a 
challenge to attract FDI as most of the developing countries do not have capable 
governments able to extract resources from its people for the purpose of improving 
economic development.  Our model suggests that a one percent increase in RPC*GDP 
will lead to a two million dollar increase in FDI.  In addition, this interaction variable also 
suggests that certain variables alone, such as RPC and GDP are insufficient in attracting 
FDI, hence there must be something more than that.  We mentioned earlier that 
Indonesia‟s GDP level is nine trillion dollars less than China‟s, which would make any 
investor choose the latter as economic development is much better in China.  
Model 4 also provides the results for the variable Open Economy, and similar to 
China, Indonesia‟s open economy is positive and significant.  We find that a one percent 
change in Indonesia‟s open economy will lead to a one hundred thousand dollar increase 
in FDI.  Again, this supports the theoretical sign in the growth literature that a developing 
country needs to have open markets as one of the requisites in attracting FDI.  However, 
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one point to make regarding open economies is Indonesia‟s archipelago system.  Unlike 
China and India where both countries are not only neighboring countries, but are massive 
in terms of land mass and population, each have mega seaports known to the international 
community.  This truly provides other countries the ability to invest and trade using direct 
routes to China‟s and India‟s massive coastlines.  Indonesia only consists of four major 
ports, while China has over 100 ports and India thirteen ports.  This is truly a big 
difference when it comes to economic development.  In addition, there are many 
provincial islands in Indonesia that are untouched where primitive groups of people still 
reside living as they did for hundreds of years; Indonesia as a whole is just starting to 
open its economy. 
We also have to take into account that even though Indonesia opened up its 
economy in the late 1960s, it was also the hardest hit during the 1997 financial crisis, 
which truly made this country notorious as a place to invest as billions of dollars were 
lost, so investors have not forgotten about that event and will continue to play a cautious 
role when investing in Indonesia.  
Now, we can check to see if our model fulfills the four tests in statistical testing.  
We also need to see how influential our variables are, particularly our interaction 
variable.  Figure 23 provides model 4 with beta coefficients.   
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Figure 25: Model 4 with Beta Coefficients 
                                                                              
       _cons     .2742575   .1107254     2.48   0.014                        .
        Open     .1487736   .0178391     8.34   0.000                 .5645853
      RPCGDP     2.324482   .2439051     9.53   0.000                 .8982839
         GDP    -2.480185   .6145347    -4.04   0.000                -.4736746
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    743.000255   181  4.10497378           Root MSE      =  1.2074
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.6449
    Residual    259.475922   178   1.4577299           R-squared     =  0.6508
       Model    483.524333     3  161.174778           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   178) =  110.57
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     182
. reg  FDI GDP RPCGDP Open, b
 
We can definitely a larger influence our interaction variable has on FDI.  From the 
previous models, we only saw a range of up to fifty-percent, but for model 4, it is nearly 
ninety percent, so we can definitely suggest that our interaction variable truly influences 
FDI in Indonesia.  Graph 23 provides a snapshot of a graphical representation of each of 
our variables in a matrix.   
Graph 22: Correlation Matrix of Model 4 
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It is no surprise that we do see minor issues similar to our previous models, so we will 
need to check if our model is normally distributed.  For this, we will test for normality 
using the kernel density estimate.  Graph 22 provides the illustration.   
Graph 23: Kernel Density of Model 4 
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We do see a normally distributed model with minor issues, but overall, does fulfill the 
criteria of a normal distribution.  Next, we need to check if our model obeys the rule of 
linearity.  Graphs 23 and 24 provides the illustration for both GDP and RPCGDP 
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Graph 24: ACPR Plot of GDP for Model 4 
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We do see some consistency in this graph, and similar to model 3, we do have GDP with 
a downward slope indicating a negative relationship with FDI.  In addition, we do see a 
slight deviation once we surpass one, but for the most part, it does provide a faily 
consistent linear curve.   
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Graph 25: ACPR Plot of RPCGDP for Model 4 
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We have a much better depiction of a linear curve when using our interaction variable.  
Unike model 3, we do not see any deviation at any point, implying that we do have a 
linear relationship with our interaction variable.  We can now check for 
heteroscedasticity.  Graph 25 visually tests for heteroscedasticity while figure 24 provides 
the results of the Breusch-Pagan test.  
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Graph 26: Residuals vs. Fitted Values 
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Figure 26: BP Test for Model 4 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =   179.32
         Variables: fitted values of FDI
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
 
Again, we see a similar trend from the previous models that our observations start to 
cluster at the beginning of the graph then slowly deviate.  Although this graph provides 
very little evidence of constant variance, not to mention the Breusch-Pagan test indicating 
that we have heteroscedasticity, we will need to address this issue by running model 4 
with robust standard errors.  Figure 25 provides the results.   
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Figure 27: Model 4 with Robust Standard Errors 
                                                                              
       _cons     .2742575   .0769293     3.57   0.000     .1224468    .4260682
        Open     .1487736   .0402672     3.69   0.000      .069311    .2282362
      RPCGDP     2.324482   .3135704     7.41   0.000     1.705688    2.943276
         GDP    -2.480185   .9320194    -2.66   0.009    -4.319414   -.6409553
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.2074
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6508
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   178) =   74.49
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     182
. reg  FDI GDP RPCGDP Open, r
 
We can see that GDP is negatively correlated with FDI, while our interaction variable of 
RPCGDP continues to be significant displaying the correct theoretical sign.  Since we 
had similar issues with previous models, we can also assume that GDP and RPCGDP 
might be highly correlated, which can enable us to omit GDP.  We test for 
multicollinearity and did find a similar trend with previous models in figure 26.   
Figure 28: Variance Inflation Inflator for Model 4 
    Mean VIF        4.63
                                    
        Open        2.34    0.428090
      RPCGDP        4.53    0.220837
         GDP        7.02    0.142431
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
 
Although GDP is not as high as other models where we experience over ten, we still have 
to be concern that GDP is showing a variance inflation inflator of seven.  Therefore, by 
omitting GDP, we can control for multicollinearity.  Figure 27 provides the variance 
inflation inflator without GDP. 
Figure 29: Variance Inflation Inflator without GDP for Model 4 
    Mean VIF        1.16
                                    
      RPCGDP        1.16    0.863044
        Open        1.16    0.863044
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
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We can definitely see a big difference when omitting GDP from the model.  We also have 
to take note that dropping GDP in the previous models actually improved our model 
while maintaining the important premise of this study that the interaction of GDP and 
RPC is necessary to effectively attract FDI.   
 Overall, there seems to be many similarities and differences among each country, 
but we can definitely attest to the importance of the interaction between RPC and GDP as 
a compelling variable to suggest a developing country‟s ability to effectively attract FDI. 
We can also note that most of the variables used do support the growth literature by its 
theoretical signs and its significance, especially in the case of China.  Further, we have 
analyzed a long list of variable outcomes that can be used in policy making for each 
provincial government of each country as we have examined the dataset results when all 
three countries are combined and individually.  
Again, to revisit when all three countries are combined, strong governments alone 
do not necessarily attract FDI, rather strong governments need strong economic policies 
to effectively attract FDI.  We see consistent results with the interaction variable of 
RPC*GDP, but when each country is analyzed, we see different results. Going back to 
our initial premise, as long as there is a commitment made by the government to improve 
economic development, it will attract FDI.  The main difference among the models is the 
notion that both India and Indonesia are democracies while China is an autocracy. Our 
models suggest that autocracies have a negative impact in attracting FDI than do 
democracies, but we need to note that China is unlike any autocratic governmental 
system as it has a proven track record of high levels of FDI for several decades.  We also 
need to note that although India and Indonesia are both democracies, they are considered 
to be developing nations, which are very different from a developed nation, such as the 
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U.S, Great Britain, and France, so it may be safe to say that democracies have a positive 
impact in attracting FDI than do autocracies, but strictly speaking for developed 
democratic nations.  Plus, these two countries were given very low CPI levels making 
investors think twice of investing their capital in a highly corrupt country, and we see 
their GDP about three times less of China‟s GDP, so it would make sense for any investor 
to take their chances in a developing country where there is less corruption and economic 
development.  
To further compare our models, we found in Model 2 that China‟s GDP level is 
positive and significant, which is consistent in the growth literature.  However, in Models 
3 and 4, we found India and Indonesia‟s GDP levels negative and significant, which 
draws to one conclusion that both of these countries GDP are detracting FDI.  In addition, 
However, all four models suggests that an open economy is key in attracting FDI as our 
results were positive and significant, which also supports the growth literature.  
 Overall, it was no surprise to see the interaction variable of RPC and GDP 
consistent for each individual country and all three countries combined in our models.  
However, we need to keep in mind that each country is vastly different from one another 
and varies in terms of economic development.  Nevertheless, our results suggest that 
developing countries in general can become an economic powerhouse, but must have a 
combination of high levels of RPC and increasing levels of GDP, an open economy, and 
more importantly, the commitment to pursue economic development policies.   
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Our analyses provide support to our hypothesis: the interaction of RPC and 
economic growth leads to provincial governments in developing countries to effectively 
attract FDI.  The results will allow future researches to examine the conditions between 
the interaction variable, and how to effectively attract FDI.  The implications are as 
follow:  
1. Provincial governments with high levels of RPC alone are insufficient to attract FDI.  
The theoretical sign and insignificance of RPC in model 1 suggests that strong 
governments do not necessarily attract FDI as strength alone may not translate to 
effective policies to improve the standard living of its country.  Overall, provincial 
governments in developing countries with a combination of economical and political 
policies are in a very good position to attract FDI.  
2. Provincial governments in developing countries with a combination of high RPC levels 
and a commitment to economic policy through economic growth lead to effectively 
attracting FDI.  Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 provide the correct theoretical sign and significance.  
This accounts for both analyzing all three developing countries (China, India, and 
Indonesia) combined and individually.  These results suggest that an interaction variable 
of RPC and economic growth is needed to jumpstart a provincial government‟s ability to 
attract FDI.  
3. On average, democracies seem to attract FDI at a better rate than autocracies.  Model 1 
provides the analyses for this claim, but we need to keep note of the developing countries 
economical and political history along with its perception of corruption by the 
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international community.  Models 2, 3, and 4 entail a different perspective from this 
claim.  
4. A developing country‟s economical and political history does matter when attracting 
FDI.  Models 2, 3, and 4 provide the analyses for China (autocratic), and India and 
Indonesia (democratic) for GDP as significant and theoretically positive and negative, 
respectively.  This suggest that China is unlike any other autocratic developing country as 
it has established itself since the mid-twentieth century as a growing Asian giant with a 
lot of economic potential.  Today, China is number two behind the U.S and continues to 
experience record growth rates each year.  Secondly, China is not seen as a highly corrupt 
country relative to other autocratic developing countries as evidence by its CPI levels.  
Lastly, when comparing China as a country, we can see its national governmental level 
more on the autocratic side, but many of its provincial governments are in fact exercising 
democratic norms within its borders.  As for India and Indonesia, both countries have 
been plagued by its past economic and political histories.  Although India is democratic 
nationally, it has its share of problems, such as its high levels of corruption and political 
instability.  This does not sit very well for many investors.  Its CPI level is higher than 
China indicating that corruption is more prevalent in India.  Plus, India still faces a 
stalemated war with Pakistan in which the tensions today have increased, especially for 
the 2008 Mumbai Attacks.  As for Indonesia, its corruption perception has also plagued 
its abilities in attracting FDI as its CPI levels are higher than both China and India.  In 
addition, Indonesia was hit hardest from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis that led to record 
inflation rates nearly 80%, rapid currency depreciation of the rupiah, and a severe 
economic contraction that decreased real GDP by more than 13%.  This gave 
international investors little faith in re-investing in a plague developing country with very 
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little promise. Indonesia today is doing much better than a decade ago, but with 
everything that has taken place, it will take time for its economic wounds to heal for 
investors to start investing again.    
5. Provincial governments in developing countries do need an open economy to attract 
FDI.  Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 show the correct theoretical sign and significance, and is seen 
as a complement to our interaction variable of RPC and GDP.  This suggests that a 
developing country with high levels of RPC and a strong commitment to economic 
policies, along with an open economy will be in a better position to attract FDI.  
 There are a lot of positive outcomes in terms of policy wise for each developing 
country.  As suggested, an interaction variable of RPC and GDP is necessary to 
effectively attract FDI.  This gives the opportunity for each provincial government to 
invest in its domestic market thereby hopefully controlling for corruption.  Many times 
we see provincial governments tied down to corrupt practices as they do not have the 
proper checks and balance system in place.  However, this will make provincial 
governments realize that they can compete with more successful provinces by focusing 
on sound economic policies rather than self-interest.  We can also analyze the potential 
outcomes that its people will gain, such as better wages, the creation of a middle class, 
and a higher economic return.  It makes perfect sense for any institutions to invest a little 
as the long-term rewards are greater for society as a whole.  In addition, when looking at 
all three developing countries, one thing stands out which are the abundance of untapped 
natural resources.   
 China‟s provinces has long been known to have raw materials waiting to be 
extracted, such as the provinces of Gansu and Qinghai, which are known to have a 
laundry list of minerals from coal and crude oil, to copper and chromium.  These are just 
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four examples of raw materials that are in high demand in the twenty-first century.  In 
fact, Gansu province itself could focus on policies to extract crude oil from the ground, 
and use it for itself and sell in the market.  This will assist the province to improve 
infrastructure that is essential for both domestic and international investors along with 
MNCs to get from one point to another.  At the rate of their growth, we should be able to 
see a much more economically successful Gansu province that can compete with the 
more well-known provinces in China, such as Hainan and Guangdong.   
 India also offers a vast number of raw materials that its own provincial 
government can effectively extract and start building its domestic economy.  Provinces 
such as Rajasthan are a great example of what is lacking in terms of sound economic 
policies.  It is the state with the second largest source of cement, which is needed to build 
roads and highways throughout the province.  However, we do not see enough effort by 
the provincial government to capitalize and exploit this resource.  We all know how 
important building infrastructure is as it connects the world to one‟s society, and more 
importantly, it allows goods to be transported by both domestic and foreign producers for 
consumers to purchase.  Further, something as simple as extracting the resources to invest 
in one‟s economy will greatly return a higher reward in the long-run, therefore it makes 
perfect sense for these provinces to start adopting sound domestic economic policies.   
 Indonesia also has plenty of islands that are uninhabited with an abundance of raw 
materials.  The islands in the east side of the country in the provinces of Maluku, Irian 
Jaya, and Papua are prime examples.  However, these provinces are very much 
underdeveloped that it does not have the basic necessities that we would expect, such as 
aqueducts, sewage system, etc.  Nevertheless, this should be the opportunity that each 
provincial government is waiting for.  Take for example Papua, which has the largest 
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concentration of forest in Indonesia.  The provincial government can focus on policies 
that would allow the extraction of timber to sell in the market, thereby generating revenue 
up to seventy billion dollars a year, which is a large amount of sum for a province with 
just under three million residents.  This can truly boost its domestic economy as the 
revenue generated along with the taxes collected from the people can build infrastructure, 
which it is in desperate need of.  Secondly, Papua also has the largest gold mine in the 
world, and since the value of gold continues to rise in the market, it makes perfect sense 
to extract this resource to generate revenue.  The opportunities are there, but there needs 
to be the initiative made by the government to want to build its economy, which is 
usually plagued by corruption and the lack of a checks and balance system.  Nevertheless, 
if these provincial governments in each developing country take advantage of the raw 
materials it possesses, we can definitely see a rise in both economic and population 
growth, thereby effectively attracting foreign investments.   
Our findings have a lot of potential to extend this literature in other developing 
countries.  It would be interesting to analyze more countries based on geographic 
locations to see how its government impacts on FDI, and whether RPC alone is sufficient 
or insufficient in attracting FDI.  Since our developing nations only consisted of three 
countries from Asia, a more thorough study would include several developing nations 
from South America, Africa, and Europe.  We could perhaps see a trend occurring in 
these countries that governments alone might actually be pushing out FDI, and may be in 
need of an interaction variable to attract FDI, such as our interaction variable of FDI and 
GDP.  If this trend persists, we can imply that developing nations do need a combination 
of strong governments that can adopt effective economic policies to improve the living 
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standards of its people in order to attract FDI.  In addition, this could also prove to be 
vital as a government policy in which any developing nation can adopt.  
 Another interesting point to make about extending our study is to include other 
developing nations within Asia.  We have chosen three of the most economical successful 
countries in Asia, so it would be worthwhile to include other developing nations that are 
considered not as successful and unsuccessful, such as the Philippines, Thailand and 
Vietnam, and Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, respectively.  We do see many strong 
governments, primarily that of the Philippines as its governmental system emulates that 
of the U.S, but its challenge is to convince international investors that their investments 
are not only safe, but can yield high returns.  This is the main issue why the Philippines 
finds itself behind most developing Asian nations as it does not have the type of 
economic appeal in the international community, not to mention its own domestic issues 
of political turmoil in Mindanao and high levels of corruption.  Moreover, it would be 
interesting to see the analyses for a country like Myanmar.  
 The United Nations still considers this plagued country by its rightful name of 
Burma, regardless of the military junta that governs the country.  However, here is one 
case where we know the rule of law is stringent, so we can assume that its RPC is greater 
than one, but has a very difficult time in attracting FDI.  We do not really here much 
nowadays about international investors flocking to Myanmar to invest their capital, hence 
we could expect to see this government turned around by adopting effective economic 
policies of improving its living standards, thus the need for an interaction variable. 
 It would also be interesting to compare and contrast our results by adding an 
additional component of religion.  We can see that China is considered as a non-religious 
country, while India and Indonesia are highly religious.  We can analyze the effects of 
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international investors and their preferences to invest in a country where no religion 
exists, or more specifically, a Hindu or Islamic country.  This could shed light to how 
religion plays a role in a government‟s ability to attract FDI.  There are a few claims that 
a developing country with no religion has the advantage of a strictly business only 
mentality, thus reducing the transaction costs of patronage to religious leaders and/or the 
infrastructure build-up on sacred land.  However, the counter arguments to this is that 
religion can attract FDI as more investors might be more inclined to invest in a 
developing country where it shares the same belief and value system.  We can also see 
the percentage of Hindus and Muslims around the world at 14% and 21%, respectively, 
versus non-religious individuals at 16%, so the likelihood of an international investor 
having a religion is much higher than no religion at all.  
 One more point to make on the additional variable of religion.  It would be 
interesting to see whether if the type of religion plays a factor in a government‟s ability to 
attract FDI.  We mentioned the percentage of individuals worldwide who considers 
themselves as Hindu or Muslim, but analyzing the perception of either of these religions 
in attracting FDI would be interesting.  Political events, such as September 11, 2001 has 
tarnished the good name of Islam worldwide as many people unfortunately associate 
„terrorism‟ with Islam, so determining whether or not the type of religion plays a role in 
attracting FDI would be beneficial for the economic growth literature and developing 
countries altogether.  
 Lastly, to further extend our analyses and findings, it would also be interesting to 
include another variable of „terrorist attack.‟  Unlike China, both India and Indonesia due 
to its democratic style of governing has been victims of terrorist attacks in the 2008 
Mumbai Attacks and 2002 and 2005 Bali Bombings.  We have not yet experienced any 
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terrorist attacks in China, and perhaps due to its strict authoritarian rule over its borders, 
but this could also play a role to international investors as they may feel more safe and 
comfortable investing in a developing country that is not plagued by terrorist attacks.  
Overall, there are a lot of additional items we would like to include to strengthen this 
research in order to better understand a provincial government‟s ability to effectively 
attract FDI in its country. Nevertheless, we have started a very interesting research in the 
sub-national level literature, and can only improve the literature with future studies.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
95 
REFERENCE PAGE 
 
 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson, (2005). “Institutions as the  
Fundamental Cause of Long-run Growth,” NBER wp 10481, Handbook of 
Economic Growth, North-Holland. Elsevier. 
 
Acemoglu, Daron; Johnson, Simon; Robinson, James A. and Thaicharoen,  
Yunyong (2002). "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in  
the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution." Quarterly  
Journal of Economics, pp 117. 
 
Alcazar, Lorena (1997). Political Capacity and the Use of Seigniorage. In  
Marina Arbetman and Jacek Kugler (Eds.). Political Capacity and Economic 
Behavior. Boulder: Westview Press. 
 
American Civil Liberties Union. Retrieved from http://aclu.org. 
 
Ang, James B. (2008). Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in  
Malaysia. Journal of Policy Modeling. New York: Jan/Feb 2008. Vol. 30, Issue 1; 
pp. 185. 
 
Ang, James B (2008). "Finance And Inequality: The Case Of India," CAMA  
Working Papers 2008-18, Australian National University, Centre for Applied 
Macroeconomic Analysis. 
 
Arbetman, M. and J. Kugler (1997). Political Capacity and Economic  
Behavior. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
Balasubramanyam, V.N, M. Salisu and David Sapsford (1996). Foreign  
Direct Investment and Growth in EP. The Economic Journal. Vol. 106, pp. 92-
105. 
 
Banga, R. (2003). The Differential Impact of Japanese and U.S. Foreign  
Direct Investments on Exports of Indian Manufacturing. Indian Council for 
Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi. 
(http://econpapers.repec.org/RAS/pba255.htm). 
 
Bhagwati, Jagdish (1987). "Quid Pro Quo DFI and VIEs: Political- 
Economy-Theoretic Analyses," International Economic Journal 1, pp. 1-14. 
 
Black's Law Dictionary: Fifth Edition. (1979). 
 
Borensztien, E., De Gregorio, J. and J-W. Lee (1998). How Does Foreign  
Direct Investment Affect Growth? Journal of International Economics. Vol. 45, 
pp. 115-135. 
 
  
 
96 
Cerdenia, Grace C (2001). Ticker Talk. Business World. Manila. 
 
Chowdhury, Abdur and George Mavrotas (2006). FDI and GDP: What  
Causes What? The World Economy. Vol. 9 No. 1 pp 9-19. 
 
De Soto, H. (2000). The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in  
the West and Fails Everywhere Else. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Dunning, J. H. (1999). Multinational Enterprises and the Growth of  
Services: Some Conceptual and Theoretical Issues. The Service Industry Journal, 
Vol. 9, pp, 5-39. 
 
Enderwick, P (1989).  Policy Issues in International Trade and Investment  
Services. Multinational Service Firms (pp. 215-244). New York: Routledge. 
 
Feng, Yi. (2003). Democracy, Governance, and Economic Performance:  
Theory and  Evidence. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
 
Feng, Yi, and et. al. (2008). Path to Prosperity: The Dynamics of Freedom  
and Economic Development. International Interactions. London:  
Routledge. 
 
Foley, C. F, and Mihir A. D., and Hines Jr, J.R. (2004). A Multinational  
Perspective on Capital Structure Choice and Internal Capital Markets. Journal of 
Finance, Vol.59, No. 6, pp. 2451-2488. 
 
Gwartney, J., and Lawson, R., S, S. R., and Leeson, P. T. (2007). Economic  
Freedom of  the World: 2007 Annual Report. Vancouver, BC: The  
Fraser Institute. 
 
Hanson, Gordon H. (2005). Globalization, Labor Income, and Poverty in 
Mexico. NBER Working Paper No. 11027.  
 
Harms, Philipp and Heinrich W. Ursprung (2002). Do Civil and Political  
Repression  Really Boost Foreign Direct Investments? Economic Inquiry. 
Oxford University:Vol. 40, pp. 651. 
 
Hayek, Friedrich (1961). The Constitution of Liberty. New York: University  
of Chicago Press. 
 
Joel Hellman et al. (2000). Are Foreign Investors and Multinationals  
Engaging in Corrupt Practices in Transition Economies? Transition, The World 
Bank/The William Davidson Institute/Stockholm Institute for Transition 
Economies. 
 
 
 
  
 
97 
Hufbauer G.C. and Schott, J.J. (2005). NAFTA Revisited, Institute for  
International Economics, Washington D.C. International Economic Development 
Council. Retrieved from http://iedc.org. 
 
International Monetary Fund. Retrieved from http://imf.org. 
 
Johnson, Kristin (2007). Sub National Capabilities and Internal Conflict.  
PhD Dissertation, Claremont Graduate University. 
 
Kane, Tim, and Kim R. Holmes and Mary Anastasia O‟Grady (2007). 2007  
Index of Economic Freedom. The Wall Street Journal. Heritage Foundation, 
 Massachusetts. 
 
Kaufmann, Daniel, et. al (2008). Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and  
Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2007. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 4654. 
 
Konan, D.E and Maskus, K.E (2004). Quantifying the Impact of Services 
Liberalisation in a Developing Country, World Bank Policy Research Paper 3193 
Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
 
Krueger, Anne O. (1974). "The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking  
Society," American Economic Review, Vol. 64, pp. 291-303. 
 
Leecraw, D.J. (1977). Direct Investments by Firms from Less Developed  
Countries. Oxford  Economic Papers, 29, 442-457. 
 
Lezard, Ashleigh (2002). Rising from the Ashes. Financial Times Business.  
 
Lundstrom, S. (2005). The Effect of Democracy on Different Categories of  
Economic Freedom. European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 21, pp. 967-
980. 
 
Mankiw, Gregory, and David Romer and David Weil (1992). A Contribution  
to the Empirics of Economic Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
 
Markusen, James R (2000). Foreign Direct Investment. Working Paper No.  
19 from the Social Science Research Network. 
 
Moran, Theordore H., & Graham E M., & Blomström, M. (2005). Does  
Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? Peterson Institute. 
 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Retrieved from 
 www.oecd.org/home/0,2987,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 
 
 
  
 
98 
Pamacheche, Fudzai, and Baboucarr Koma (2007). Privatization in Sub- 
Saharan Africa. African Integration Review. Vol. 1, 2. Political 
Instability Task Force. Retrieved from http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/ 
 
Ross, Michael (1999). The Political Economy of the Resource Curse. World  
Politics, Vol. 5, pp. 297-322. 
 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. & Warner, Andrew M. (2001). The Curse of Natural  
Resources. European Economic Review. Elsevier, Vol. 45(4-6), pp. 827-838. 
 
Schneider, F. and B. Frey (1985). Economic and Political Determinants of  
Foreign Direct Investment. World Development, Vol. 13, pp. 161–175. 
 
Singer, H.W. 1950. U.S. Foreign Investment in Underdeveloped Areas: The  
Distribution of Gains Between Investing and Borrowing Countries. American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings Vol. 40, pp. 473-485.  
 
Snyder, Jack (2000). From Voting to Violence: Democratization and 
Nationalist Conflict. New York: W.W. Norton. 
 
Suellentrop, Chris (2004). America‟s New Political Capital. Slate.  
 
The World Bank. (2005). World Development Report 2005: A Better  
Investment Climate for Everyone. The World Bank Publications. 
 
Transparency International. Retrieved from http://transparency.org. 
 
United Nations. Retrieved from http://un.org. 
 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Retrieved from http://www.bea.gov/. 
 
Vos, R., Taylor, L., Paes de Barros, R. (2002). Economic Liberalization,  
Distribution and Poverty. Latin America in the 1990’s, Edward Elgar Publishing 
Ltd., Cheltenham. 
 
Wells, L. T., Jr. (1981). Foreign Investors from the Third World.  
Multinationals from Developing Countries. Washington, DC: Health. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
99 
APPENDIX A 
List of Provinces by Country, 1994-2000 
China 
1. Beijing 
2. Tianjin 
3. Hebei 
4. Shanxi 
5. Inner Mongolia 
6. Liaoning 
7. Jilin 
8. Heilongjiang 
9. Shanghai 
10. Jiangsu 
11. Zhejiang 
12. Anhui 
13. Fujian 
14. Jiangxi 
15. Shandong 
16. Henan 
17. Hubei 
18. Hunan 
19. Guangdong 
20. Guangxi 
21. Hainan 
22. Chongqing 
23. Sichuan 
24. Guizhou 
25. Yunnan 
26. Tibet 
27. Shaanxi 
28. Gansu 
29. Qinghai 
30. Ningxia 
 
India 
1. Andhra Pradesh  
2. Arunachal Pradesh 
3. Assam 
4. Bihar 
5. Goa 
6. Gujarat 
7. Haryana 
8. Himachal Pradesh 
9. Jammu & Kashmir 
10. Karnataka 
11. Kerala 
12. Madhya Pradesh 
13. Maharashtra 
14. Manipur 
15. Meghalaya 
16. Mizoram 
17. Nagaland 
18. Orissa 
19. Punjab 
20. Rajasthan 
21. Sikkim 
22. Tamil Nadu 
23. Tripura 
24. Uttar Pradesh 
25. West Bengal 
26. Chattisgarh 
27. Uttaranchal 
28. Delhi 
29. Pondicherry 
30. Daman & Diu 
 
Indonesia 
1. Di Aceh 
2. Sumater Utara  
3. Sumatera Barat 
4. Riau 
5. Jambi 
6. Sumatera Selatan 
7. Bangka Belitung 
8. Bengkulu 
9. Lampung 
10. Banten 
11. Dki Jakarta 
12. Jawa Barat 
13. Jawa Tengah 
14. Di Jogyakarta 
15. Jawa Timur 
16. Bali 
17. Nusatenggara Barat 
18. Nusatenggara Timur 
19. Timor Timur 
20. Kalimantan Barat 
21. Kalimantan Tengah 
22. Kalimantan Selatan 
23. Kalimantan Timur 
24. Sulawesi Utara 
Gorontalo 
25. Sulawesi Tengah 
26. Sulawesi Selatan 
27. Sulawesi Tenggara 
Maluku 
28. Maluku 
29. Irian Jaya 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
Open Economy Issue Continuum 
 
1 
Close Economy 
  
 
100 
Low GDP and Low FDI 
<10 billion and <10 million 
25 
Partially Open 
Low-Medium GDP Low-
Medium FDI 
10-20 billion and 11-25 
million 
50 
Midway Open 
Medium GDP Medium FDI 
21-40 billion and 26-50 
million 
75 
Opening Economy 
Medium-High GDP Medium-
High FDI 
41-60 billion and 51-100 
million 
100 
Open Economy 
High GDP High FDI 
60 billion and >100 million 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX C 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable Observations Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation 
FDI 489 7.850 1202166.900 60699.907 161234.247 
  
 
101 
GDP 489 149071.500 162740958.800 18949572.990 25405273.966 
GDP*RPC 489 79824.980 179212888.450 17382080.522 21604627.787 
Democracy 489 0.000 1.000 0.587 0.493 
Open 
Economy 489 1.000 100.000 29.575 34.785 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX D 
List of Countries and Variables: FDI, RPC, GDP, 
RPC*GDP, Democracy, and Open Economy 
 
  
 
102 
                                                                              
       _cons    -68.46979    19.4352    -3.52   0.000    -106.6576     -30.282
        Open     .5731089   .2915571     1.97   0.050      .000235    1.145983
         Dem      44.2538   15.02325     2.95   0.003     14.73494    73.77265
      RPCGDP     13.83407   8.687737     1.59   0.112    -3.236266    30.90441
         GDP     34.64317   7.792103     4.45   0.000     19.33264     49.9537
         RPC    -3.179844    12.6194    -0.25   0.801    -27.97542    21.61573
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    12693283.4   489  25957.6349           Root MSE      =  107.59
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.5540
    Residual     5602970.5   484  11576.3853           R-squared     =  0.5586
       Model    7090312.95     5  1418062.59           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5,   484) =  122.50
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     490
. regress  FDI RPC GDP RPCGDP Dem Open
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E 
Correlation Matrix for All Countries 
 
  
 
103 
FDI
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RPCGDP
Dem
Open
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APPENDIX F 
  
 
104 
List of Countries and Variables: FDI, RPC*GDP, Democracy, and Open Economy 
                                                                              
       _cons    -85.41803   15.39139    -5.55   0.000    -115.6599   -55.17614
        Open     1.217187   .2738233     4.45   0.000     .6791635    1.755211
         Dem     53.07678   15.31617     3.47   0.001      22.9827    83.17087
      RPCGDP     45.45263   3.784264    12.01   0.000     38.01709    52.88817
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    12693283.4   489  25957.6349           Root MSE      =  110.62
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.5286
    Residual    5946546.41   486  12235.6922           R-squared     =  0.5315
       Model    6746737.04     3  2248912.35           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   486) =  183.80
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     490
. regress  FDI RPCGDP Dem Open
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX G 
  
 
105 
List of Countries and Variables: FDI, RPC*GDP, Democracy, and Open Economy with 
Beta Coefficients 
                                                                              
       _cons    -85.41803   15.39139    -5.55   0.000                        .
        Open     1.217187   .2738233     4.45   0.000                 .2636274
         Dem     53.07678   15.31617     3.47   0.001                 .1624458
      RPCGDP     45.45263   3.784264    12.01   0.000                 .6088342
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    12693283.4   489  25957.6349           Root MSE      =  110.62
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.5286
    Residual    5946546.41   486  12235.6922           R-squared     =  0.5315
       Model    6746737.04     3  2248912.35           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   486) =  183.80
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     490
. reg  FDI RPCGDP Dem Open, b
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX H 
  
 
106 
List of Countries and Variables: FDI, RPC*GDP, Democracy, and Open Economy with 
BP Test and Robust Standard Errors 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =  1160.93
         Variables: fitted values of FDI
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -85.41803   16.11135    -5.30   0.000    -117.0745   -53.76153
        Open     1.217187   .3322728     3.66   0.000     .5643185    1.870056
         Dem     53.07678   13.09901     4.05   0.000     27.33909    78.81447
      RPCGDP     45.45263   9.295288     4.89   0.000     27.18871    63.71654
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  110.62
                                                       R-squared     =  0.5315
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,   486) =   51.91
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     490
. reg  FDI RPCGDP Dem Open, r
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX I  
  
 
107 
List of Countries and Variables: FDI, RPC*GDP, Democracy, and Open Economy with 
VIF Test and Independence Test 
    Mean VIF        2.86
                                    
         Dem        2.28    0.438679
      RPCGDP        2.67    0.375156
        Open        3.65    0.274061
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons      5.34683   5.245167     1.02   0.309    -4.959122    15.65278
      _hatsq     .0015591   .0001741     8.95   0.000      .001217    .0019012
        _hat     .4645922   .0716218     6.49   0.000     .3238662    .6053182
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    12693283.4   489  25957.6349           Root MSE      =  102.39
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.5961
    Residual    5105995.23   487  10484.5898           R-squared     =  0.5977
       Model    7587288.21     2  3793644.11           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   487) =  361.83
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     490
. linktest
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX J 
  
 
108 
List of Chinese Provinces and Variables: FDI, RPC, GDP, RPC*GDP, Democracy, and 
Open Economy  
                                                                              
       _cons    -114.1801   68.87145    -1.66   0.099    -249.9958    21.63562
        Open     1.069654   .4916123     2.18   0.031      .100186    2.039122
      RPCGDP     22.03393   20.04665     1.10   0.273     -17.4984    61.56627
         GDP       28.508   17.66764     1.61   0.108    -6.332896     63.3489
         RPC      8.56277   63.43543     0.13   0.893     -116.533    133.6586
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    10463908.6   202  51801.5277           Root MSE      =  162.36
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4911
    Residual    5219274.92   198  26359.9743           R-squared     =  0.5012
       Model    5244633.68     4  1311158.42           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,   198) =   49.74
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     203
. reg  FDI  RPC GDP RPCGDP Open
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109 
Correlation Matrix for Chinese Provincial Governments 
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APPENDIX L 
  
 
110 
List of Chinese Provinces and Variables: FDI, RPC*GDP, Democracy, and  
Open Economy  
                                                                              
       _cons    -120.5288   24.55994    -4.91   0.000    -168.9585   -72.09917
        Open     1.527802    .452441     3.38   0.001     .6356352    2.419968
      RPCGDP     50.31244   6.031247     8.34   0.000     38.41945    62.20543
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    10463908.6   202  51801.5277           Root MSE      =   163.9
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4814
    Residual    5372350.76   200  26861.7538           R-squared     =  0.4866
       Model    5091557.84     2  2545778.92           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   200) =   94.77
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     203
. reg  FDI RPCGDP Open
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX M 
  
 
111 
List of Chinese Provinces and Variables: FDI, RPC*GDP, Democracy, and Open 
Economy with Beta Coefficients 
                                                                              
       _cons    -120.5288   24.55994    -4.91   0.000                        .
        Open     1.527802    .452441     3.38   0.001                 .2186385
      RPCGDP     50.31244   6.031247     8.34   0.000                 .5401194
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    10463908.6   202  51801.5277           Root MSE      =   163.9
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4814
    Residual    5372350.76   200  26861.7538           R-squared     =  0.4866
       Model    5091557.84     2  2545778.92           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   200) =   94.77
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     203
. reg  FDI RPCGDP Open, b
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX N 
  
 
112 
List of Chinese Provinces and Variables: FDI, RPC*GDP, Democracy, and Open 
Economy with BP Test and Robust Standard Errors 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =   168.44
         Variables: fitted values of FDI
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -120.5288   20.20951    -5.96   0.000    -160.3799   -80.67777
        Open     1.527802   .3723442     4.10   0.000     .7935777    2.262026
      RPCGDP     50.31244   9.603889     5.24   0.000     31.37457    69.25031
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =   163.9
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4866
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   200) =   48.69
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     203
. reg  FDI RPCGDP Open, r
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX O 
  
 
113 
List of Chinese Provinces and Variables: FDI, RPC*GDP, Democracy, and Open 
Economy with VIF Test and Independence Test 
    Mean VIF        1.63
                                    
      RPCGDP        1.63    0.612347
        Open        1.63    0.612347
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     18.14626   15.12752     1.20   0.232    -11.68365    47.97617
      _hatsq      .001108   .0002386     4.64   0.000     .0006374    .0015786
        _hat     .5174793   .1247579     4.15   0.000     .2714697     .763489
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    10463908.6   202  51801.5277           Root MSE      =  155.72
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.5319
    Residual    4849700.83   200  24248.5042           R-squared     =  0.5365
       Model    5614207.77     2  2807103.88           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   200) =  115.76
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     203
. linktest
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX P 
  
 
114 
List of Indian Provinces and Variables: FDI, RPC, GDP, RPC*GDP, Democracy, and 
Open Economy  
                                                                              
       _cons     2.097693   7.924111     0.26   0.792    -13.62352     17.8189
        Open     .4493911   .1126185     3.99   0.000     .2259591    .6728231
      RPCGDP     14.64116   7.531773     1.94   0.055    -.3016679    29.58398
         GDP    -10.25492   6.302628    -1.63   0.107    -22.75915    2.249316
         RPC    -1.730007   7.105118    -0.24   0.808    -15.82636    12.36634
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    20966.6564   104  201.602465           Root MSE      =  10.712
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4308
    Residual    11475.4638   100  114.754638           R-squared     =  0.4527
       Model    9491.19263     4  2372.79816           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,   100) =   20.68
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     105
. reg  FDI RPC GDP RPCGDP Open
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Correlation Matrix for Indian Provincial Governments 
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116 
List of Indian Provinces and Variables: FDI, RPC*GDP, Democracy, and  
Open Economy  
                                                                              
       _cons     1.078991   2.135462     0.51   0.614    -3.156688    5.314669
        Open     .4655915   .1132671     4.11   0.000     .2409268    .6902562
      RPCGDP     2.509929   3.104728     0.81   0.421    -3.648285    8.668142
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    20966.6564   104  201.602465           Root MSE      =  10.823
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4189
    Residual    11948.8555   102  117.145642           R-squared     =  0.4301
       Model    9017.80089     2  4508.90044           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   102) =   38.49
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     105
. reg  FDI RPCGDP Open
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117 
List of Indian Provinces and Variables: FDI, RPC*GDP, Democracy, and Open Economy 
with Beta Coefficients 
                                                                              
       _cons     1.078991   2.135462     0.51   0.614                        .
        Open     .4655915   .1132671     4.11   0.000                 .5607731
      RPCGDP     2.509929   3.104728     0.81   0.421                 .1102868
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    20966.6564   104  201.602465           Root MSE      =  10.823
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4189
    Residual    11948.8555   102  117.145642           R-squared     =  0.4301
       Model    9017.80089     2  4508.90044           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   102) =   38.49
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     105
. reg  FDI RPCGDP Open, b
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118 
List of Indian Provinces and Variables: FDI, RPC*GDP, Democracy, and Open Economy 
with BP Test and Robust Standard Errors 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =    78.14
         Variables: fitted values of FDI
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     1.078991   1.990471     0.54   0.589      -2.8691    5.027081
        Open     .4655915   .1430765     3.25   0.002     .1817999    .7493831
      RPCGDP     2.509929   3.922868     0.64   0.524    -5.271062    10.29092
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  10.823
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4301
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   102) =   16.08
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     105
. reg  FDI RPCGDP Open, r
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
119 
APPENDIX U 
List of Indian Provinces and Variables: FDI, RPC*GDP, Democracy, and Open Economy 
with VIF Test and Independence Test 
    Mean VIF        3.33
                                    
      RPCGDP        3.33    0.300210
        Open        3.33    0.300210
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     1.945937   2.185846     0.89   0.375    -2.389679    6.281553
      _hatsq     .0177532   .0137913     1.29   0.201    -.0096018    .0451081
        _hat     .4823085   .4177518     1.15   0.251    -.3463003    1.310917
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    20966.6564   104  201.602465           Root MSE      =  10.737
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4282
    Residual      11757.84   102  115.272941           R-squared     =  0.4392
       Model    9208.81639     2   4604.4082           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   102) =   39.94
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     105
. linktest
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX V 
  
 
120 
List of Indonesian Provinces and Variables: FDI, RPC, GDP, RPC*GDP, Democracy, 
and Open Economy  
                                                                              
       _cons     .6347423   .2245881     2.83   0.005     .1915273    1.077957
        Open     .1540622   .0179519     8.58   0.000     .1186349    .1894895
      RPCGDP      2.70909   .3199174     8.47   0.000     2.077746    3.340433
         GDP     -3.02872   .6792864    -4.46   0.000    -4.369262   -1.688177
         RPC    -.3358668   .1824391    -1.84   0.067    -.6959026     .024169
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    743.000255   181  4.10497378           Root MSE      =  1.1993
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.6496
    Residual    254.600809   177  1.43842265           R-squared     =  0.6573
       Model    488.399445     4  122.099861           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,   177) =   84.88
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     182
. reg  FDI RPC GDP RPCGDP Open
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Correlation Matrix for Indonesian Provincial Governments 
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122 
List of Indonesian Provinces and Variables: FDI, RPC*GDP, Democracy, and  
Open Economy  
                                                                              
       _cons     .1227931   .1085287     1.13   0.259    -.0913672    .3369534
        Open     .0976624   .0130894     7.46   0.000      .071833    .1234919
      RPCGDP     1.475341   .1285396    11.48   0.000     1.221693    1.728989
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    743.000255   181  4.10497378           Root MSE      =  1.2579
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.6146
    Residual    283.219832   179   1.5822337           R-squared     =  0.6188
       Model    459.780423     2  229.890212           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   179) =  145.29
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     182
. reg  FDI RPCGDP Open
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123 
List of Indonesian Provinces and Variables: FDI, RPC*GDP, Democracy, and Open 
Economy with Beta Coefficients 
                                                                              
       _cons     .1227931   .1085287     1.13   0.259                        .
        Open     .0976624   .0130894     7.46   0.000                  .370622
      RPCGDP     1.475341   .1285396    11.48   0.000                 .5701379
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    743.000255   181  4.10497378           Root MSE      =  1.2579
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.6146
    Residual    283.219832   179   1.5822337           R-squared     =  0.6188
       Model    459.780423     2  229.890212           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   179) =  145.29
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     182
. reg  FDI RPCGDP Open, b
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124 
List of Indonesian Provinces and Variables: FDI, RPC*GDP, Democracy, and Open 
Economy with BP Test and Robust Standard Errors 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =   235.92
         Variables: fitted values of FDI
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .1227931   .0597225     2.06   0.041     .0049423    .2406439
        Open     .0976624    .030217     3.23   0.001     .0380351    .1572897
      RPCGDP     1.475341   .1186215    12.44   0.000     1.241265    1.709418
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.2579
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6188
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   179) =   92.27
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     182
. reg  FDI RPCGDP Open, r
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125 
List of Indonesian Provinces and Variables: FDI, RPC*GDP, Democracy, and Open 
Economy with VIF Test and Independence Test 
    Mean VIF        1.16
                                    
      RPCGDP        1.16    0.863044
        Open        1.16    0.863044
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0912672   .1409198    -0.65   0.518     -.369345    .1868106
      _hatsq    -.0384942   .0362164    -1.06   0.289    -.1099601    .0329718
        _hat     1.218578   .2137971     5.70   0.000     .7966911    1.640465
                                                                              
         FDI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    743.000255   181  4.10497378           Root MSE      =  1.2539
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.6170
    Residual    281.443518   179  1.57231016           R-squared     =  0.6212
       Model    461.556737     2  230.778368           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   179) =  146.78
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     182
. linktest
 
 
 
 
 
